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Disasters are momentous events in the history of a place. They are momentous
in people’s memories, as well as momentous in the changes that occur in the built
environment of the place. Recent disasters such as Hurricane Katrina on the Gulf Coast
in 2005, Hurricane Hugo in Charleston, South Carolina in 1989, and the 1989 Loma
Prieta and 1994 Northridge earthquakes in California have left shattered lives and
landscapes. The field of historic preservation studies history and memory in order to
establish levels of significance in the landscape of the built environment. The field of
disaster management studies hazards, risks, response, and recovery in order to
minimize trauma and loss after a disaster. These two fields overlap in many ways, and
the purpose of this thesis is to examine the integration of historic preservation into the
field of disaster management, and also to examine the integration of disaster
management considerations into the fields of historic preservation, planning, and
architecture.
The thesis approaches the field of historic preservation through the structure of
the social science-oriented field of disaster study. Disaster policies can be very different
in different countries; therefore, this thesis is a study of disaster management and
historic preservation policy in only the United States, although it uses historical examples
from various countries to examine basic principles of the different ways that places
respond to disasters and choose to rebuild. Disaster preparedness, response, and
recovery all require extensive collaboration among professionals from various fields.
These professionals may not ever work together in their daily operations, but in planning
for disasters, or in the actual event of a disaster, they must work together toward the
common goal of recovery of a place and a population after a tragedy.

CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION

3

In the past, historic preservation has not been integrated into the field of disaster
management, which is primarily concerned with protecting human life and restoring
basic services that support life and settlement immediately after a disaster. Historic
preservation, and more generally, the treatment of property during and after a disaster,
has been rightly viewed as a secondary consideration to the much more important
priority of preserving human life. In the last decade, however, as the fields of both
historic preservation and disaster management have matured and have become more
sophisticated, professionals in the two fields have recognized the need for increased
collaboration. There has been a realization that the preservation and protection of
cultural resources is important in the mental and emotional rebuilding of a place; the
unnecessary destruction of cultural resources after disasters causes unnecessary
emotional distress and pain.
Professionals in the field of historic preservation as well as society in general
have long recognized the need for preservation of monumental architecture. However,
disasters are not discriminate and do not only affect monumental buildings, but also
vernacular houses, streetscapes, and cultural landscapes. This thesis discusses
preservation policies and disaster policies with respect to these more vulnerable
vernacular resources. These types of resources are extremely vulnerable to damage or
loss in a disaster situation. They are, in general, constructed of more fragile materials
than large-scale public architecture and in many cases do not have dedicated disaster
managers who can administratively either plan and prepare for a disaster or manage a
recovery from a disaster.
Vernacular resources may not be listed individually on a local historic register or
the National Register of Historic Places, and therefore not formally recognized as
significant. They could then be easily overlooked by professionals executing disaster
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recovery who are not trained in historic preservation, and even by preservation
professionals themselves with the lack of administrative integrity for this type of
resource. These resources, though fragile, are extremely important in the recovery of a
place after a disaster. Each small component of a historic district, landscape, or cultural
landscape contributes to the sense of a place as an ensemble, and the loss of any
component, no matter how small or seemingly insignificant, has a negative effect on the
character of the place.
The thesis begins by discussing general definitions of a disaster in Chapter 2 and
the importance of cultural resources in the rebuilding process. This chapter explains the
vulnerability of cultural resources post-disaster, especially the vulnerabilities of
vernacular architecture and neighborhoods, then identifies research gaps in disaster
studies and cultural resource management. Chapter 3 theorizes about factors that
influence the recovery of places after disasters, specifically the application of broad
disaster preparedness and response theories to planning, preservation, and
architecture. It uses examples from historical disasters to examine these factors and
how they relate to preservation specifically.
Chapter 4 outlines basic disaster management principles and discusses the
history of disaster policy and preservation policy in the United States and how the two
fields overlap under current policies. Chapter 5 examines the role of federal agencies
such as FEMA and the Advisory Council on Historic Preservation in disaster
management, and additionally explores the role of national non-governmental
organizations such as the National Trust for Historic Preservation and the American
Planning Association in disasters. Chapter 6 outlines the role of state and local
governments and organizations. It uses Hurricane Katrina as an example to emphasize
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the close relationships among federal, state, and local entities that are necessary in the
disaster management process.
The last chapter of the thesis draws conclusions on the integration of disaster
management and historic preservation and suggests topics for further research. Perhaps
the most important conclusion of the research is that the response to a disaster and its
negative effects on cultural resources such as vernacular architecture are vastly
improved by adequate and systematic preparation for such events. The lack of a
response plan can be deadly for cultural resources, and therefore the collective memory,
history, and culture of communities. The individual and social fabric and life of a place is
already disrupted by the event of a disaster, and the loss of historic resources can
compound the loss and make it more devastating. Conversely the preservation of
cultural resources post-disaster can provide comfort and assist in the mental and
emotional recovery of a population. Preservationists do not automatically include
disaster preparedness in their everyday efforts to care for cultural resources such as
buildings, districts, and landscapes. However, as preservation or maintenance work is
done, the disaster hazards, risks, and vulnerabilities should be evaluated and mitigation
actions taken.
A significant problem in the disaster recovery process is not only that
preservationists do not consider disasters, but also that disaster managers do not
automatically include historic preservation considerations in their efforts. Many are
unaware of the negative effects that the loss of historic fabric has on places. Even
professionals in the fields of planning and architecture, which are closely related to
preservation, in many cases do not include preservation in their disaster planning or
rebuilding efforts. Decisions that are made immediately following a disaster (during the
short-term recovery phase) can needlessly destroy historic fabric and cultural resources.
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Such destruction is not reversible, and decisions about what to save and what to
demolish should be given adequate consideration before action is taken. Preservation
professionals should be involved early in the recovery process in order to include cultural
resources in the options for the future of the place.
These conclusions were reached through an examination of current federal
disaster and preservation policies. Additionally, national, state, and local preservation
and disaster organizations were studied for their overlapping roles in the treatment of
cultural resources with respect to disasters. This thesis answers the basic question of
how preservation and disaster policy and organizations overlap, but raises many more
questions for the future as both professions struggle with the recovery of the Gulf Coast
after Hurricane Katrina, and will undoubtedly experience many more devastating
disasters in the future.
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The Inevitability of Disasters and Destruction
The word “disaster” is defined by the Encarta Dictionary as “an event that causes
serious loss, destruction, hardship, unhappiness, or death.” Another more specific
definition of disaster was written by Charles Fritz, a pioneer in social science disaster
studies, in 1961:
…an event, concentrated in time and space, in which a society, or a
relatively self-sufficient subdivision of a society, undergoes severe danger
and incurs such losses to its members and physical appurtenances that
the social structure is disrupted and the fulfillment of all or some of the
essential functions of the society is prevented. (Fritz 1961, 655, as stated
in Mileti 1999, 210)

These two definitions encompass both man-made and natural disasters including
hurricanes, war, floods, civil disturbances and riots, nuclear accidents, landslides,
economic depression or disinvestment, plane crashes, and even some urban renewal
projects. In a more basic sense, a disaster is an event that causes destruction to the
built environment—the places in which humans live, work, and recreate. Just as quickly
as people build roads, buildings, and parks, there are forces such as wind, hail,
economics, and political conflicts that destroy them. These forces are inevitable, and
because of the pain that they cause, people will always study them and work to prevent
them and mitigate their damage. Carl Nelson states this inevitability succinctly: “the
question is not if, but when and where, disaster will strike next” (Nelson 1991, 36).

The Importance of Cultural Resources Post-Disaster
Disasters that change our built environment are traumatic. For thousands of
years, humans have chosen to settle the world in patterns, creating meaning in the built
environment of our inhabited places (Atkin and Rykwert 2005, 1). Because of these

CHAPTER 2: DISASTERS AND CULTURAL RESOURES

9

established meanings, when a disaster occurs and changes our immediate
surroundings, it devastates not only the physical fabric of the place, but also the
meaning of the place, and therefore our sense of belonging and meaning. The FEMA
guide, Integrating Historic Property and Cultural Resource Considerations into Hazard
Mitigation Planning, states, “Whether a disaster impacts a major community museum, a
historic ‘main street,’ or collections of family photographs, the sudden loss of historic
properties and cultural resources can negatively impact a community's character and
economy, and can affect the overall ability of the community to recover from a disaster
event” (FEMA 2005, 1).
The negative impacts of a disaster on culture and character mentioned above are
difficult to define. In the aftermath of a disaster, people naturally look for remnants of the
familiar in order to cope with unexpected trauma. For example, the realization that a
beloved landmark was destroyed can add to the pain of the disaster, and conversely, the
realization that a landmark was spared can add hope to the recovery process. Postdisaster, the material objects that remain can be vehicles of recovery and can help
restore stability where it has been shattered. Historic preservationists, as cultural
resource professionals, are trained to work with the public to help determine value and
significance in the built environment, and therefore can be invaluable in allocating
resources in the rebuilding process as well as providing advice to the public on methods
of repair to historic buildings and landscapes that will preserve as much of the meaning
of the place as possible.
The scope of the field of historic preservation has evolved and broadened over
time from focusing on simply preserving specific buildings and historic districts to
studying and preserving landscapes and cultural landscapes as well. Cultural
landscapes are composed of the connections between elements of the built environment
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such as vernacular architecture, streetscapes, small businesses, and open space and
the memories and history attached to the built environment. Cultural landscapes
recognize the present “working landscapes” that represent continuity and evolution of
human interaction with the land. This newer, broader scope of preservation directly
applies to disaster management, as preservationists today are not only interested in
preserving or rebuilding individual buildings that are damaged in events such as fires,
but also facilitating preservation of landscapes and cultural landscapes that may be
damaged by larger-scale disasters such as flooding, forest fires, earthquakes, and
tornados. In the case of Hurricane Katrina in New Orleans, elements of the built
environment such as levees and canals are themselves important components of the
cultural landscape, as they were the components of the built environment that failed and
caused much of the flooding disaster.
Memories and history attach meaning to landscapes and are much more difficult
to assess and repair post-disaster than the wood or bricks of a particular building.
Materials can be replaced, and costs can be estimated for a certain type of repair to a
building, but it is difficult to attach a monetary replacement value to a beautiful tree or a
house that is significant because a prominent person lived there. However, preserving or
restoring elements of the physical built environment can help to preserve the memories
and history of a cultural landscape; the restoration of the physical remains can be an
asset in the emotional and social recovery process. Therefore policy dealing with culture
is necessary post-disaster.

Research Gaps in Disaster Studies and Cultural Resource Management
Disasters are an urgent public issue, and with their frequent occurrence, one
might expect that disaster preparedness and recovery has been widely studied. In some
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areas of research, this is true. The field of disaster studies is a specialty to which entire
professional degrees in social fields are devoted1. The volumes and articles which have
been written on the topic fill libraries. It is a multi-disciplinary field that involves
researchers and practitioners in fields including ecology, geology, geography, history,
engineering, architecture, planning, psychology, sociology, medical administration,
economics, and government policy, as well as many other specialties.
There are generally two approaches to disaster research. The first is research on
the different natural hazards that exist on the earth such as volcano eruptions,
earthquakes, or hurricanes. This type of research is generally performed by physical
scientists such as geologists, meteorologists, and geographers. It includes projects such
as analyzing a particular place for its inherent hazards, or determining the probability of
a certain type of disaster occurring in a particular place, such as the probability that an
earthquake of a certain magnitude will occur in northern California within a certain
number of years. The second type of disaster research is focused on emergency
preparedness, response, and recovery and is most often studied by social scientists. An
example of this type of research is measuring housing loss after a disaster and
developing policies for restoring housing to a disaster-devastated area (Tierney 2001,
22-3).

1

Numerous colleges and universities across the country offer bachelors and masters degrees in
fields such as Emergency, Crisis, and Disaster Management and Homeland Security. The
University of North Carolina offers a curriculum in “Community Preparedness and Disaster
Management” with a certificate program and plans for Associates, Bachelor’s, and Masters
degrees in Disaster Management. George Washington University offers a Master of Science in
Engineering Management and Systems Engineering with a concentration in Crisis, Emergency
and Risk Management as well as a Graduate Certificate in Homeland Security Emergency
Preparedness and Response and Emergency Management and Public Health. For a complete
listing of colleges, universities, and institutions offering Emergency Management courses, see
FEMA’s “Emergency Management Institute” website:
http://www.training.fema.gov/emiweb/edu/collegelist/
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There are multiple intersections between disaster study and physical design,
which includes the fields of architecture, landscape architecture, city planning, and
historic preservation. Planners approach the field of disaster study from the standpoint of
long-term sustainability. They work on planning cities to be more resistant to disasters by
identifying hazards such as flood plains or earthquake faults, and planning uses for
these geographical features such as parks or open space that would sustain less
damage than housing or commercial buildings in the event of a disaster. Architects and
engineers study methods of designing or retrofitting buildings to be disaster resistant.
They are constantly devising new methods of flood-proofing buildings and making them
more resistant to the forces of earthquakes, for example. In the disaster recovery phase,
planners, architects, and preservationists are essential in assessing damage and
advising property owners as well as public officials on rebuilding efforts.
This thesis studies the intersections of disasters and design by researching
historic preservation, planning, and disaster policies, analyzing their application in past
disasters, and applying the current policies to current disasters. It places specific
emphasis on the relationships between disaster managers and planners,
preservationists, and designers, in order to bridge gaps between different disciplines and
hopefully promote better communication and coordination among the professionals,
stakeholders, and leaders all involved in the messy disaster preparation and recovery
process.
In the field of historic preservation, there are some specific areas of study related
to disaster planning and response that have been widely researched and published, and
others that have not. There are publications on the management of historic sites such as
museums, but not on disaster management and historic districts or cultural landscapes.
Historic preservation has some roots in and therefore strong connections to the fields of
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museum studies and conservation of objects. As a result, there are numerous articles
and books published by organizations such as the Getty Conservation Institute
describing the process of disaster preparation and response for managers of museums
or historical sites. Objects and buildings can be quickly damaged or even eliminated by
events such as fire and floods; they are particularly prone to loss of value due to these
disasters. Therefore, great measures are taken to protect museum objects such as fire
suppression systems, fire detection systems, and elaborate disaster preparedness plans
and training. There is also published research on the treatment of individual buildings
with respect to disasters. Books and articles have been written on methods for refitting
buildings to make them more resistant to the forces of earthquakes or floods.
There has been far less research, however, on larger geographic areas of
cultural resources such as historic districts, landscapes, and cultural landscapes. One
possible reason for this lack of research is that historic districts have no designated
historic preservation manager or caretaker. Historic districts have been a focus of
preservation for decades, but after an area is designated a National Historic District
there is no requirement in federal policy for the district to be managed or maintained.
This problem of a lack of administrative integrity for certain types of cultural resources
means that there is less focus on them with respect to preservation research.
It is much easier for preservationists, and the public in general, to identify
landmark architecture as a priority in rebuilding and focus resources on this type of
cultural resource rather than historic districts. The decisions of what to save, what to
rebuild, and what to demolish after a disaster depend on many factors such as
economics, extent of damage, and material and cultural value. The highly valued
landmarks of a settlement are almost always recognized as a priority for rebuilding. The
rebuilding of such landmarks serves as a symbol to all that even after a disaster, the
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place remains, and the people also persevere. However, in addition to damage to major
individual landmarks, damage to other parts of the familiar environment of local
neighborhoods, or the destruction of all or part of the ensemble such neighborhoods
represent, can be just as devastating. This is an important intersection between historic
preservation, especially preservation planning, and disaster studies, and one on which
only limited study has been focused.

The Vulnerability of Cultural Resources Post-Disaster
There are certain forms in our built environment that are more vulnerable to the
forces of a disaster than others. Some types of buildings are stronger than others in
withstanding disaster forces. Large, public buildings that are constructed of high quality
masonry and/or steel usually fare much better than smaller vernacular buildings that are
of light masonry or timber-framed construction. Additionally, the pre-disaster condition or
maintenance of the building is a factor in how well it fares during the disaster; those that
are occupied and in relatively good repair prior to a disaster can withstand stronger
forces than buildings that were abandoned and/or in poor condition prior to a disaster.
Also, landscapes and vegetation are particularly susceptible to damage or destruction by
wind or flooding; many species of trees and vegetation do not fare well under strong
forces such as high winds and flooding. Landscapes also can take much more time to
restore than a building; 100-year old live oaks take 100 years to grow to the size that
they were prior to a disaster.
Historic districts and cultural landscapes are assets that are extremely vulnerable
to damage in disaster events. They are typically composed of many elements and may
be in various states of repair. They are generally more vernacular cultural resources that
are constructed of lighter materials. They are generally privately owned, in contrast to
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larger public buildings such as libraries or schools, and their maintenance is subject to
the income level and/or skill of the owner. In many cases individual public buildings such
as courthouses are much better maintained than historic districts that contain many
abandoned buildings and are inhabited by lower-income residents. It is quite common
that destruction is distributed unevenly in a community; neighborhoods that are older or
in states of disrepair or that serve lower-income residents and business owners may
suffer disproportionately higher losses (Schwab et al. 1998, 89). Also, trees and
vegetation are character-defining features in some historic districts as well as certain
other landscape elements such as rows of streetlights or benches. These types of
elements are particularly susceptible to wind and flood damage and are difficult to
replace, once lost.
Administrative integrity, again, is another reason that historic districts are
vulnerable to damage and/or loss post-disaster. When no agency or person is
specifically designated to care for a district, individual property owners conduct their own
post-disaster assessments, make their own decisions about what to demolish and what
to keep, and consequently, integrity of the district could be lost. One other vulnerability of
historic districts post-disaster is the inevitable tension that exists between historic
preservation and rebuilding. People want to return order to a disorderly place and return
their lives to “normal” after a disaster as quickly as possible, and it takes time for
preservationists to evaluate significance and time for planners and public officials to
work with the public to determine priorities and a vision for rebuilding. It is difficult for
planning and preservation to be effective when they are forced into being reactive. They
are by nature careful and analytic professions. In the absence of a well-thought-out predisaster recovery plan, preservation and planning, when forced by circumstance into
reactive stances, can be seen as obstacles to rebuilding.
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In addition, government agencies often put deadlines on monetary grants for
demolition or repair, which force property owners to make decisions very quickly on
whether and/or how to rebuild. Decisions can be made early in the recovery process that
destroy cultural resources and severely limit future decisions about the character of the
place. Consequently, the very thing that can restore continuity and structure to people’s
lives—the stability of the surrounding cultural resources and environment—is in grave
danger of being unnecessarily lost.
In his 1999 book, Disasters by Design, Dennis Mileti makes this point about postdisaster planning which is directly related to preservation:
After disasters, critical policy choices emerge, forcing unwelcome
decisions on local government about whether to rebuild quickly or safely.
Postdisaster recovery and reconstruction planning and management
commonly reflect an effort to balance certain ideal objectives with reality.
Recovery is characterized by wanting to (1) rapidly return to normal, (2)
increase safety, and (3) improve the community…Real decisions are
likely to be severely limited by economic pressure and pressure to decide
quickly. The pressures to restore normalcy in response to victims’ needs
and desires are so strong that safety and community improvement
goals—modifying land use, retrofitting damaged buildings, creating new
parks, or widening existing streets—are often compromised or
abandoned. (Mileti 1999, 233)

Therefore, it is important to identify very early in the rebuilding process, or even earlier in
pre-disaster planning, which physical material resources have cultural meaning in a
community. This can help prevent rapid decisions that in the long run can be more
harmful to the recovery and rebuilding efforts. Many places do this in the form of
comprehensive preservation plans or dedicated campaigns to evaluate the cultural
resources of the place. Some places value preservation more and put more resources
into such an evaluation. Others do not, and after a disaster when decisions must be
made quickly, there is often not enough time for a thoughtful evaluation of cultural
resources.
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Several factors that are either directly or indirectly related to preservation,
planning, and architecture influence how and how quickly a place recovers after a
disaster:
•

Type of disaster and scale of destruction

•

Nature of place affected

•

Type or quality of leadership

•

Amount of planning and training pre-disaster

•

Sustainability of the place

These factors are described below in general disaster management terms, and also
specifically with respect to planning, preservation, and architecture.
It is difficult, if not impossible, to quantify whether a particular recovery action is
“successful” in the rebuilding process. For many disciplines, success must be measured
quantitatively. This is an inherent problem in disaster studies; different professions, let
alone different people, have different ideas of the best way to return lives to normal
following a disaster, and therefore have different definitions of disaster “recovery.”
Additionally, different types of people use different timelines to measure post-disaster
recovery; some types of recovery are accomplished much more quickly then others. For
example, in come cases it is possible to rebuild an individual building much faster than
rebuilding a shattered economy. Success in cultural recovery can be measured in terms
of economic recovery, psychological recovery, the vibrancy of a neighborhood, or the
physical rebuilding of fabric in buildings or roads. Another problem in studying the effects
of actions in disaster recovery is that disaster losses tend to be quantified in monetary
units, but there are many types of losses that are not monetarily quantifiable. Examples
are the loss of a human life, the loss of a beach, unrecoverable time for children in
school, or psychological trauma (Pielke and Pielke 1997, 135). Loss of cultural
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resources is another type of loss that is difficult to measure in monetary units. The loss
of an historic building cannot be quantified by its tax assessed value prior to a disaster;
an historic building has more value than just the money in its materials. The loss of an
entire neighborhood and the physical and social patterns it embodies is another
significant intangible loss.
One measure of “recovery” after disasters that is specific to historic preservation
is the rebuilding/restoration of cultural resources such as buildings. Another additional
goal is the successful preservation of as much pre-disaster character as possible,
whether this be the preservation of character-defining architectural elements or
landscape elements or even character-defining uses such as restoring corner stores to
corner store buildings or residents to residential buildings. Another guiding principle for
preservationists is that change cannot, and should not, be prevented, but only managed.
Part of managing the change that is inherent in disasters is rebuilding neighborhoods
while allowing the disaster to become a part of the collective memory of the place. This
can be done by memorializing the event in some formal way, such as constructing a
dedicated memorial, or memorializing the event simply by preserving the clues and cues
of the rebuilt environment such as newer buildings interspersed with older buildings.
Memorials for more somber events such as war, slavery, or natural disasters
take many forms, but the presence of a physical memorial in any form can be the vehicle
or medium that connects the present and future to the past events that have helped to
shape our culture. Natural disasters are important events in history, and memorials to
these events can reinforce that significance. Therefore in historic preservation, “cultural
success” following a disaster can perhaps be defined as not only the retention of as
many cultural resources (such as buildings or museums) as possible, but the
management of the changes in the historic built environment in order to facilitate the
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healing process of its residents. During this process the disaster becomes part of the
collective memory; rebuilding does not obliterate it, but merely adds another layer to
memory.

Type of disaster and scale of destruction
A somewhat obvious factor in the recovery of places is the type and scale of the
disaster. There are many different types of disasters. In general they can be categorized
as either those caused by natural hazards or events (volcanic eruptions, tornados, and
earthquakes, for example), those caused by deliberate acts such as war, terrorism, or
property neglect, or disasters caused by accidents such as plane crashes or
technological disasters like chemical spills or nuclear accidents. In general, natural
events such as hurricanes that affect uninhabited areas are not considered human
disasters even though they can be considered a “disaster” to the natural landscape of
vegetation or animals. For the purposes of this thesis, a disaster is defined as a collision
of an event with people, or with people’s property; certainly disasters such as hurricanes
that damage ecosystems but not inhabited areas are still disasters, but will not be
addressed here.
In general, people react to damage to their built environment somewhat
differently based on whether the damage was due to a purely natural event or whether it
was a deliberate or man-made cause. In some types of disasters such as war or other
political conflicts, landmarks in the built environment are deliberately destroyed in order
to cause emotional devastation; there is a specific meaning in the destruction. There are
numerous examples of this throughout time ranging from the razing of the ancient city of
Carthage to the destruction of the World Trade Center in New York in 2001 to the
bombing of an important Shiite mosque in Iraq in 2006. In these cases, people as a part
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of the grieving process experience strong feelings of anger and hostility towards other
people. In order to make statements of societal or political resiliency there is a tendency
to rebuild an area quickly as well as “bigger and better” than it was before the disaster.
In the case of intentional acts, people want to create meaning in the rebuilding process,
which can result in a transformation of place. Such was the case in several European
cities after the world wars in the early to mid-twentieth century such as Rotterdam and
Plymouth, England. Additionally, places that are rebuilt almost as exact replicas also
transform place. Warsaw, Poland was such an example after the destruction of World
War II. Even in places that have been completely rebuilt in a new form, there are
examples of certain iconic reminders of the disaster being retained. The city of Plymouth
stabilized and preserved the bombed-out shell of a church as a reminder of the
devastation of the bombings. A church in Delaware preserved its charred keystone when
the entire structure had to be rebuilt following a devastating fire. Hiroshima, Japan, has
preserved reminders of the devastation of an atomic bomb, while rebuilding the city.
Another effect of deliberate events such as terrorist attacks or war is that national
support is stirred; the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 were seen not as an attack
against New Yorkers, but an attack on the United States, and therefore national aid
flowed into the city for the recovery and rebuilding efforts, though the effectiveness of
this large-scale response remains to be seen. In contrast, disasters such as the Exxon
oil spill in Alaska were seen as a result of negligence or human error on the part of
Exxon personnel, and therefore economic and environmental cleanup was mostly seen
as the responsibility of Exxon.
The categorizing of disasters is more difficult when damage is caused by a
combination of natural hazards and man-made vulnerabilities. In many cases, disasters
expose human inadequacies or deficiencies in design or engineering. The damage to
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New Orleans after Hurricane Katrina is one example where damage was seemingly
initiated by a natural event (Hurricane Katrina), but then flooding was actually caused by
human mismanagement of the maintenance of the levee system. The hurricane did
cause high storm surges, but then these storm surges rushed up canals and exposed
levees to extreme forces. The levees were poorly-maintained, and were breached,
causing most of the serious flooding in New Orleans. Therefore the damage was caused
by a combination of the natural hazard of storm surges and the man-made vulnerability
of poorly-maintained, and perhaps even poorly designed and constructed levees. In the
case of Katrina, millions of dollars of aid have been sent to the Gulf Coast, however
many residents still do not have the ability to return to their houses and lives. When aid
is poorly managed after a disaster, even millions of dollars may not get residents the
relief they need.
One last comparison in how the type of event affects the type of preparedness
and response is the comparison between events that are expected (such as some types
of natural disasters like flooding in a river floodplain), and events that are unpredictable
(such as some acts of terrorism). It is very difficult if not impossible to predict where
terrorist acts will occur, and therefore more difficult to plan and mitigate such events. It is
somewhat easier to plan for natural disasters such as flooding and hurricanes that are
relatively predictable.

Nature of place affected
Factors that affect the disaster planning and recovery of a place are its size (area
as well as population density) and its economy. Disasters affect rural areas and urban
centers in very different ways. Relocation from smaller places has more obvious and
apparent impact; the town of Valmeyer, Illinois almost completely relocated to higher
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ground when it was flooded by the Mississippi River in 1993. Population centers with
hundreds of thousands, or millions of people in some ways seem to withstand disasters
like flooding more easily and have less of a tendency to completely relocate. Therefore
in general larger settlements seem to be more able to absorb large-scale disasters, or
be more disaster-resilient than smaller settlements.
The state of the economy in a place pre-disaster also has large implications for
how and how quickly the place will recover. Places with healthy economies will in
general recover more quickly, and in the same or similar form that they were before the
disaster, than places that were in economic decline prior to the disaster. The cities of
London and Chicago both experienced large-scale fires (in 1666 and 1871, respectively)
that destroyed large portions of their urban fabric. Both cities were experiencing
economic stability or growth, and both cities rebuilt quickly, maintaining in large part their
pre-disaster grids of streets and blocks, but transforming their identities while
simultaneously absorbing the disaster into their perspective sense of place.
Certain places chose to capitalize on widespread destruction as an opportunity to
make large-scale changes in the built environment. The cities of London and Chicago
are also examples of this; although they retained their basic street grids, they took the
opportunity to create enormously ambitious rebuilding plans, overhauled their
architectural vocabularies and, and presented themselves as cities transformed. These
types of transforming decisions are also made in either smaller settlements such as
Valmeyer, or in places that were in economic decline such as Plymouth, England.
Following massively destructive World War II blitzes in 1940-1, the city of Plymouth
chose to demolish large portions of its medieval, crowded, and unsanitary working-class
neighborhoods in order to construct a grand, axial commercial center containing modern,
wide boulevards and streets.
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Type or quality of leadership
The way a place rebuilds after a disaster is directly related to the quality of
leadership in the rebuilding process. Some places have very strong governmental
leaders who are able to take charge in a crisis situation and effect swift recoveries. An
example of strong leadership following a disaster is the mayor’s role in the rebuilding of
Kobe, Japan after a devastating earthquake in 1994. Kobe mayor, Kazutoshi Sasayama
made an immediate decision to institute a moratorium on rebuilding in order to
accomplish extensive city planning. This decision meant that residents were displaced
for years, but Sasayama’s insistence on creating open space to protect buildings from
future earthquakes and fires was a long-term success for the city. This type of strong,
and in some ways unpopular, decision-making by governmental leaders worked in
Japan, where government is more authoritarian than in the United States. In contrast,
New Orleans Mayor Ray Nagin has not made strong decisions about the planning and
rebuilding of the city; these decisions can be extremely unpopular with residents who are
displaced and want to return to their homes as soon as possible—and who vote in
mayoral elections.
In order to have good leadership, there must be of course not only good leaders,
but also a high level of trust between leaders and the people they lead. This can be
called the quality or nature of the “followership.” If people have a high opinion of their
leaders prior to a disaster and trust in their decision-making abilities, they will be able to
trust these same leaders after a disaster to make good decisions. The decisions of these
leaders will not be questioned as much and will therefore be much more effective than
those of a leader who had low approval before a disaster. In that case, the leader’s
decisions will be questioned and therefore the recovery process may be slowed.
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Leadership does not have to be in the form of an individual governmental leader.
Post-disaster, city, state, and federal officials are immediately, and rightly so, concerned
with the rescue and recovery of the lives of their residents and restoring public services
as soon as possible. Even strong leaders may not be able to handle the large-scale
response process as well as be able to simultaneously evaluate these decisions with
respect to long-term recovery. In these cases, or in the case of weak governmental
leadership, other people can fill leadership voids. These people can be leaders of civic
groups, neighborhood associations, spiritual leaders, educational leaders, or for the
purposes of this thesis, leaders in planning, preservation, or architecture.
In Charleston, South Carolina following Hurricane Hugo in 1989, Charles Chase,
the city’s preservation officer, led the recovery efforts at the request of the mayor and
managed an immediate and effective restoration for Charleston’s preservation-minded
property owners (Nelson 1991, 43). In Chase’s own words, “The basis for Charleston’s
recovery effort and its ability to work effectively with property owners, insurance
adjusters, architects, and contractors grew out of a long-standing, indeed
institutionalized, knowledge of the city’s resources” (Chase 2005, 13). Charleston had
good historic preservation administrative integrity prior to the storm, and this integrity led
to an effective rebuilding process. Leadership roles in historic preservation efforts
following disasters can be filled by people other than preservationists. When
administrative integrity for managing cultural resources is compromised after a disaster
(or did not even exist prior to a disaster in the case of many historic districts),
neighborhood groups and/or individuals can be preservation managers.
Clearly a network of leadership is essential in the case of a lack of governmental
leadership, or even to supplement effective leadership. A collaborative leadership
network was established in New York following the 2001 attacks on the World Trade
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Center. The Regional Plan Association of New York, New Jersey, and Connecticut
immediately established a coalition of planning and design professionals, community
advocates, union representatives, and public officials to guide the rebuilding process
while city’s leaders were overwhelmed with the immediate response to the disaster
(Regional Plan Association 2005, 3). This network was quite successful in initiating quick
post-disaster planning for a region in crisis, which is very important in a field such as
planning that in normal circumstances takes time and adequate consideration in order to
be accomplished successfully. Post-disaster, planning efforts need to be jump-started,
and RPA was successful in that way. Unfortunately, in the longer-term however, the
plans initiated by the RPA coalition have been stalled by disagreements among political
figures and the private developer who owned the rights to develop the land.
An example of an institution taking a leadership position after a disaster was the
leadership of Tulane University in New Orleans following Hurricane Katrina. Tulane
officials made the decision to re-open the University in January of 2006, just four months
after the devastation of Katrina. They made this decision while the city officials
languished over recovery efforts and deliberated for months about how the city would
begin the rebuilding process. Tulane University did reopen in January as planned,
bringing back thousands of college students to an otherwise nearly deserted city.
Unity is very important in rebuilding, and unity in decisions can be promoted by
good leadership. In places that are vastly divided—racially, socially, economically—
rebuilding is more difficult and takes longer to achieve. In some places, the actual event
of the disaster can unite people who were previously divided. Such was the case in NYC
where the terrorist attacks were a uniting force for New Yorkers. In contrast, the people
of New Orleans were quite divided prior to the flooding, and therefore it has been difficult
to make unified decisions of how to proceed with the rebuilding efforts.
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Amount of planning and training pre-disaster
There is no question that the amount of planning and training accomplished prior
to a disaster has a great effect on how the place recovers after a disaster. Places that
are subject to repetitive hazards such as hurricanes in general have better preparedness
plans and training than places that are not considered to be hazard-prone. Key West,
Florida experiences tropical storms and hurricanes on a regular basis. The town
contains significant cultural resources such as the National Historic Landmark Ernest
Hemingway House, National Register Truman White House, and two distinctive, historic
residential districts. Because of Key West’s vulnerability for hurricanes, caretakers of the
designated cultural resources are familiar with hurricane preparedness actions like
installing hurricane shutters. Residential property owners are also familiar with ways to
protect their homes from hurricane damage. Hurricanes are an accepted risk of living in
the Florida Keys, and people plan and prepare for storms, reducing the damage that
hurricanes can do. Planning in places that are hazard-prone can be accomplished by
pre-disaster mitigation plans, or by post-disaster recovery plans that include mitigation
for future disasters. It is quite common for municipalities that experience disasters less
often to avoid accomplishing disaster planning or mitigation until after a disaster occurs.
Unfortunately it only takes one disaster to devastate cultural resources; it is always
important for places to plan. It is also important for places to include cultural resources in
their disaster planning.

Sustainability of the place
A recent trend in disaster studies is mitigation through promoting sustainable
ideas in development and design of populated places. This is more directly applicable to

CHAPTER 3: FACTORS IN DISASTER RECOVERY

28

places that are vulnerable to natural hazards rather than political conflicts or deliberate
events. Certain places have natural hazards that are beyond the control of humans;
there is obvious risk associated with settling and building in these places. Current
disaster theory as well as theories in planning and architecture state that humans create
vulnerabilities in the places and the methods in which we build. With advances in the
nineteenth and twentieth centuries in engineering and construction, humans have tried
to reduce vulnerabilities by employing sophisticated engineering techniques. The levees
in New Orleans are a perfect example of huge engineering feats necessary to protect
settlements from natural hazards. A more recent theory in designing settlements,
however, is to design with knowledge of hazards, or designing our built environment to
be in harmony with nature instead of overcoming it. Mileti writes in Disasters by Design
that land-use planning which keeps people and property out of the way of natural
disasters, maintains the mitigative qualities of natural environmental systems, and
designs development to be resilient in the face of natural forces creates a much more
sustainable built environment (Mileti 1999, 156).
When places experience a disaster, they rebuild in a variety of more—or less—
sustainable ways. On one extreme are places that decide to completely relocate in order
to eliminate the hazard. An example is the town of Valmeyer, Illinois which moved
almost its entire town to higher ground after the Midwest floods of 1993. Some places
choose to rebuild in the same place, but by using different materials and/or different
design and building techniques, vulnerabilities can be reduced (mitigation). An example
of this is the rebuilding that took place after the Chicago fire of 1881. In order to prevent
future damage from widespread fires, streets were widened, buildings were designed
differently, and masonry and metal construction were used more than timber. These
different materials and methods made Chicago a much more sustainable city with
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respect to the hazard of fire. At the other extreme are places that decide to rebuild in the
same places with the same levels of protection, or the same building typologies and
materials; here there is a complete absence of mitigation or sustainability.
This trend towards sustainability in disaster management is yet another threat to
cultural resources, as many important cultural resources were designed and built in
times where attitudes in construction were of overcoming nature and natural disasters
rather than designing with respect to natural landscapes and forces. Because some
cultural resources are no longer sustainable with respect to current trends in disaster
management, they may be targeted for demolition or relocation, losing or diminishing the
historical significance of the resource. An example of this is the Mid-City Historic District
in New Orleans. Many of the historic buildings were constructed after 1900, when the
formerly swampy area was drained by a pumping system. The area still lies below sea
level and is particularly susceptible to flooding; it sustained severe damage during the
Hurricane Katrina floods. There are many neighborhoods that are located in
unsustainable areas; that is, they will be always susceptible to flooding, but at the time
they were built, assurances were made by the federal government about the protection
of the area by levees constructed by the Army Corps of Engineers. These
neighborhoods were built with the understanding that they would be protected in a time
of flooding, but the levees were never built to sustain damage from a very strong
hurricane, and additionally, these levees were not kept in good repair, and therefore
failed when New Orleans was hit with storm surge from Hurricane Katrina. While
preservationists may want to preserve these important vernacular neighborhoods in New
Orleans, preservation would only be made practical by massive expenditures for
construction and maintenance of levee systems. Many disaster professionals do not
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consider places such as this to be sustainable, and therefore recommend returning the
landscape to its more natural existence.
Sustainability in post-disaster recovery is one of the most important trends in the
disaster management field today. Taxpayers will not tolerate the huge federal
expenditures needed in order to rebuild places multiple times. Disaster managers and
preservationists in their own individual fields view sustainability as important, but they
define and evaluate it differently. A key definition of “sustainability” was developed by the
World Commission on Environment and Development in the late 1980s: “development
that meets the needs of the present without compromising the ability of future
generations to meet their own needs” (Mileti 1999, 29). The Commission made the point
that economics, ecology, and social equity are inseparable with respect to sustainability.
In the 1990s as part of a national assessment on natural and technological
hazards and disasters, prominent disaster researcher and sociologist Dennis Mileti
defined six principles of sustainable hazards mitigation, which included the issues of
quality of life, environmental quality, local resilience to and responsibility for disasters,
economic vitality, equity of resources for future generations, and adopting a consensusbuilding approach to disaster management, starting at the local level (Mileti 1999, 3035). Preservationists define sustainability as executing preservation policy and methods
that can be sustained for the future, and protecting cultural resources for future
generations.
Where historic preservation and disaster management cross paths, these
definitions must be merged. Disaster managers must redefine their definition of
sustainability to include cultural values and cultural resources rather than relying on
economic and ecological values. None of the principles of sustainable hazards mitigation
in Mileti’s book directly address historic preservation, however several are related, and
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can be better defined to include historic preservation. Quality of life is enhanced by the
character of a place. Preservation can contribute to economic vitality; in New Orleans
the tourism industry is largely based on the cultural resources of the historic city. Historic
preservation is about creating resilience in our cultural resources in both daily life, and
with respect to events like disasters. Preservation preserves cultural resources for future
generations.
As disaster managers should redefine sustainability to include preservation,
preservationists should include disaster considerations in their efforts to increase the
sustainability of cultural resources. Both professions need to work together to make
recommendations about what to do with damaged historic buildings or landscapes postdisaster. This collaboration will not always be easy. Returning to the example of the MidCity Historic District in New Orleans, while disaster managers may say that the area is
not sustainable because of its low elevation, preservationists may say that New Orleans
is not sustainable without its cultural resources, including those located in the Mid-City
Historic District. This is perhaps a perfect example of where Mileti’s last principle,
adopting a consensus-building approach to disaster management starting at the local
level, could be applied to determine the best course of action for cultural resources in
New Orleans.

CHAPTER 4
PRINCIPLES OF DISASTER MANAGEMENT
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Definitions
The design fields of planning, preservation, and architecture may use different
definitions of disaster terms than the field of disaster studies, so it is important to define
what is meant by certain words. I have quoted the following definitions directly from The
Vulnerability of Cities, a 2003 book by Dr. Mark Pelling, a leading scholar in the field of
disaster risk and public policy (Pelling 2003, 5):
Risk
Hazard

Vulnerability
Physical vulnerability
Social vulnerability
Human vulnerability
Resilience
Disaster

To be threatened by harm. To be at risk is to be under threat of
harm
The potential to harm individuals or human systems. In this
work, hazard is ascribed to natural, physical, or environmental
elements. It can be everyday (scarcity of clean drinking water)
or episodic (volcanic eruption)
Denotes exposure to risk and an inability to avoid or absorb
potential harm
Vulnerability in the built environment
Vulnerability experienced by people and their social, economic
and political systems
The combination of physical and social vulnerability
The capacity to adjust to threats and mitigate or avoid harm.
Resilience can be found in hazard-resistant buildings or
adaptive social systems.
The outcome of hazard and vulnerability coinciding. Disaster is
a state of disruption to systemic functions. Systems operate at
a variety of scales, from individuals’ biological and
psychological constitutions or local socio-economies to urban
infrastructure networks and the global political economy

The relationships among these different terms can be complicated. Many places
that people choose to inhabit, despite their inherent advantages also have inherent
hazards. Earthquakes are a hazard in California, hurricanes are a hazard along the Gulf
Coast, and flooding is a hazard in low-lying areas near rivers. By settling these areas,
humans take on a certain amount of risk. Identifying vulnerability is a key concept in
disaster preparedness; human actions can be taken to reduce certain vulnerabilities.
Pelling’s definition of disaster, that it is “the outcome of hazard and vulnerability
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coinciding,” implies that by either avoiding hazards, or eliminating vulnerability, disasters
can be avoided, or at least the damage minimized.

The Disaster Cycle
Disaster management takes place in a continuous cycle as illustrated in Fig. 1
(Schwab et al. 1998, 19). It is divided in theory into segments based on the repetitive
cycle of the event of a disaster followed by a period of response, followed by recovery
and rebuilding, followed by lessons learned and preparation for future disasters, then the
event of another disaster. The process of mitigation is continuous throughout the entire
cycle.

Figure 1: The Disaster Cycle
(Schwab et al. 1998, 19)

Each of these segments, or phases, is not equal in length of time or equal in
amount of money and/or resources expended. Additionally, the roles of scientists,
professionals, public officials, and the public, the perceived “customer” in the disaster
preparedness and response business, are different in each phase. To further complicate
matters, in an urban setting more than one disaster can be unfolding at a given time,
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and/or different parts of the city could be experiencing different phases of the disaster
cycle (Pelling 2003, 13). For example, one section of a city might be only slightly
damaged by a flood, and move through the phases of the cycle quickly, while another
section may be severely damaged and progress more slowly. Professionals involved in
the process need to understand the different stages of the disaster cycle and the roles
that they can or should play in each stage.
The occurrence of a disaster is a benchmark in the cycle. The disaster usually
has a defined beginning and end, and is relatively short in duration. In large-scale
disasters that are somewhat predictable and that affect places with effective disaster
management plans in place, by the time the disaster occurs (with at least some prior
notice), the place may be evacuated, and only populated by public safety officials such
as police, fire, and engineering personnel to protect municipal functions such as
water/sewer services and provide protection/security/rescue services to the community.
During the disaster, these personnel can play a large role in the number of lives saved
and in the amount of damage incurred or prevented; they can prevent damage by quickresponse actions such as assessing damage and covering roofs or repairing damaged
water pumps.
The response phase begins during the disaster, or immediately prior to the
disaster if possible, and continues for a relatively short period of time. This is a chaotic
time for a municipality as services are directed towards rescue efforts, damage control,
and quick damage assessments in order to evaluate whether the disaster recovery can
be accomplished by the local government, or whether state and/or federal assistance is
needed. These actions can play a crucial role in preventing damage to cultural
resources. Obviously, the most important actions during a disaster are those that protect
and rescue human life, but in prioritizing efforts to save property, public safety officials, if
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trained properly, could focus efforts on areas containing important cultural resources
first, then protect other places as resources allow. If improperly trained, or even
untrained, these important responders could miss opportunities to protect cultural
resources.
The recovery phase is characterized by returning municipal services to residents
and businesses, rebuilding, and recovering from psychological wounds. This is a
particularly vulnerable time for cultural resources as recovery actions that may be seen
as immediate in nature could be implemented without regard or consideration for their
effects on cultural resources. The preparedness phase occurs after the more immediate
tasks are accomplished. Here the response and recovery can be evaluated for strengths
and weaknesses and recommendations made for future disaster preparedness.
As illustrated in the Disaster Cycle diagram (Fig. 1), mitigation is a continuous
process of evaluating the effects of many different actions with respect to a disaster, and
taking action to reduce the potential negative effects of a future disaster. Mitigation
includes identification of risk and vulnerabilities, then taking action to reduce these risks
and vulnerabilities. Mitigation is perhaps the most important element of the disaster
cycle, and is depicted as a continuous process. Important steps in mitigation occur
immediately following a disaster as rebuilding occurs. For example, in an attempt to
mitigate damage from a future flood, people may elevate houses as they rebuild, or
rebuild in a completely different place. Both of these actions have serious ramifications
with respect to historic preservation. Mitigation also occurs in the preparedness phase
when research on a particular disaster response is evaluated in order to improve the
response process for future disasters. The mitigation phase is also continuous at the
national level as professionals research disasters in general, disaster response, and
policy in order to improve the response phase. The Federal Emergency Management
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Agency (FEMA) employs specialists in preservation who are continuously researching
ways to protect cultural resources, and academics and professionals in the fields of
planning, preservation, and architecture are also more recently realizing the importance
of including disaster considerations in their fields.
Unfortunately, in many situations mitigation is only executed in the recovery
phase; if a place has not been exposed to a recent disaster, mitigation and
preparedness may not be a priority. It is very important, however, to continue to
emphasize to both public officials as well as preservation and planning professionals the
fact that disaster mitigation is a continuous process and should occur at all times in a
community. It is vital to rebuild communities in a safe manner so that damage is reduced
in future disasters, but it is also essential to think about the effect that day-to-day
decisions made by localities have in the event of a future disaster. An example in the
planning field is that daily decisions made on development issues have effects on
vulnerability of a place. Specifically, there have been explosions in development and
population in coastal areas that result in high risk for experiencing hurricanes. When
hazardous places are developed, disaster mitigation needs to occur in order to minimize
vulnerabilities to hazards.
In this sense, mitigation can be described as “pre-event planning”. This term was
used by Dennis Mileti in Disasters by Design, in which he argues that the notion of predisaster planning for post-event recovery is a relatively new (since approximately the late
1980s) and powerful concept in disaster management (Mileti 1999, 233). This idea
creates a particularly important role for preservationists, planners, and architects in not
only the post-disaster recovery phase, but the pre-disaster preparedness phase as these
professions are directly involved in the physical rebuilding of a place. Platt also defines
hazard mitigation as “reducing vulnerability to natural hazards through safer design of
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structures and communities,” which demonstrates the importance of design
professionals (Platt 1999, 10).

Past approaches to disaster policy
The approaches to disaster preparedness and response can be simply
categorized as either reactive (response and recovery in the disaster cycle) or proactive
(preparedness and mitigation). In many cases disasters cannot be anticipated, and
therefore preparation cannot be accomplished. Situations such as the NYC terrorist
attacks are an example. Even though specific terrorist acts cannot be anticipated,
prevention does occur in actions such as increasing security at airports and designing of
prominent buildings to resist the forces of bombs. However, there are many natural
disasters that are predictable because of known natural hazards, and therefore planning
and mitigation are both quite possible as well as desirable.
The way that localities prepare for disasters varies widely across geography and
also across time. Different geographies require different mitigation strategies;
earthquake preparedness is different than planning for flooding. Different periods in
history have also treated disaster preparedness and response differently. In the ancient
past, disaster mitigation to the extent that it existed was accomplished by either not
settling in places that were hazardous, or by completely moving a settlement after a
major disaster occurred. The built environment in the past was treated in some ways as
more transient than many urban places are in modern centuries. However, there are
also numerous examples of beloved places that were protected from disasters and also
rebuilt after them. The idea of permanence rather than transience of a place with respect
to disasters is described as “resilience” by Lawrence Vale and Thomas Campanella,
who organized a colloquium at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology in the spring
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of 2002 entitled “The Resilient City: Trauma, Recovery, and Remembrance.” Resilience
was discussed with respect to disasters of all types and cities of all ages, including
ancient cities such as Jerusalem and Tokyo and relatively modern cities such as
Washington D.C. and Los Angeles in their 2005 book, The Resilient City.
In more recent centuries, technological and engineering advances have
changed the way that humans occupy the earth, enabling settlement in areas with
hazardous potential that may not have been possible in ancient times. In many locations
in the modern world, especially within developed and industrialized societies, when
settlements are destroyed by disasters, the technological and economic resources can
be mobilized to rebuild in the same hazardous place, but with different materials or
techniques that can reduce exposure to damage from future natural disasters. Because
of the capabilities of such engineering and building technologies, people have settled
more widely in hazardous areas, relying on engineering to protect the settlement from
the natural hazards inherent in the place.
There are many settlements such as this throughout the world; San Francisco is
a place where people accept the high risk of earthquakes and use earthquake-resistant
building techniques. New Orleans is another example of such a place, as many parts of
the city exist below sea level, and are therefore vulnerable to repetitive flooding from the
Mississippi River. In its early, eighteenth-century history, settlement was limited to the
higher ground close to the river. In the nineteenth century, as the city grew in population
and economic importance, levees were constructed and the Mississippi River was more
and more controlled by engineering in order to protect the city from the repeated flooding
that had occurred there throughout its history. Additionally, massive pumping systems
were built, and swamps were drained and settled.
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Such settlement patterns have precipitated changes in the way that governments
are involved in disaster preparedness and response. In many situations, the damage
incurred by the collision of a large natural disaster with a highly settled place has had
great impacts on societies. Disasters in the United States, such as the Galveston flood
of 1900, the San Francisco earthquake of 1906, and the damage from Hurricane Katrina
in New Orleans in 2005, affected thousands of people and their property. These
disasters were of such a magnitude that state and local governments could not
effectively handle the response and rebuilding efforts themselves, requiring federal
intervention. However, earlier events such as those around the turn of the twentieth
century were handled much differently than the disaster in New Orleans in 2005.

The changing role of the federal government in disaster policy
The balance between local, state, and federal roles in disaster response has
changed in the last century, somewhat paralleling the increasing role of the federal
government in other programs. The second half of the twentieth century saw a dramatic
shift in the role of the federal government in response to natural disasters. Rutherford H.
Platt, in his 1999 book Disasters and Democracy (13), defines three eras in federal
disaster assistance:
•
•
•

Early Period (1880s to 1940s) – Negligible or Ad Hoc Federal Assistance
Transitional Period (1950s to 1980s) – Limited Federal Disaster Assistance
Recent Period (1980s to present) – Abundant Federal Disaster Assistance

The Federal Disaster Relief Act of 1950 (PL 81-875) was a benchmark in federal
disaster assistance, intended to standardize federal response to disasters. It placed
responsibility of initiating federal involvement with the President instead of with
Congress, which in the past had drafted legislation specific to each disaster. Platt likens
this increase in federal disaster assistance to the increasing role of the federal
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government in other social programs of the post-war 1940s such as Social Security,
farm subsidies, and veterans’ benefits (Platt 1999, 9).
Since 1950, legislation such as the Disaster Relief Acts of 1966 (PL 89-769),
1969 (PL 91-79), and 1974 (PL 93-288), and the Disaster Assistance Act 1970 (PL 91606) steadily expanded the scope of federal disaster assistance. Various disaster aid
programs were instituted by this legislation, and were administered by many diverse
federal agencies such as the Federal Civil Defense Administration, the Department of
Housing and Urban Development, the Small Business Administration, and the Veterans
Administration. A presidential Executive Order in 1979 created the Federal Emergency
Management Agency (FEMA), which has since consolidated federal disaster
management functions under one roof (Schwab et al. 1998, 35). None of this legislation,
however, directly or even indirectly, addresses the issues of historic preservation and
disaster management.

Federal disaster policy reform
As a result of twentieth-century disaster legislation, federal expenditures for
disaster relief increased by staggering amounts in the second half of the twentieth
century; $5 million was expended in the year 1950, $52 million was spent in 1953, then
approximately $119 billion was disbursed in the 15-year period between 1977 and 1993
(Platt 1999, 23). Criticism of such enormous and growing expenditures, as well as
accusations that Presidential Disaster Declarations have been made or withheld for
political reasons instead of out of genuine necessity, have precipitated an enormous
amount of review and revision of federal disaster policy in the last two decades.
Therefore Platt’s recent era of “Abundant Federal Disaster Assistance” from the 1980s to
the present can be further defined as “Abundant Federal Disaster Assistance and Policy
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Reform” where federal disaster assistance has shifted from purely post-disaster aid to
significant pre-disaster hazard analysis and mitigation programs. There are several
changes in disaster policy and management that occurred during the 1980s and 1990s.
The administration of President Clinton responded differently to disaster
management and the administration of FEMA than the first Bush administration did in
the 1980s. President Clinton appointed James Lee Witt as the director of FEMA in 1993
and elevated the position to cabinet level (Daniels and Daniels 2000, 5 and 13). Also in
1993, FEMA disaster assistance programs were reviewed by the National Performance
Review. The National Performance Review report concluded that “FEMA’s basic role
should be to serve as the federal government’s coordinator of assistance for state and
local governments overwhelmed by disaster, and as a catalyst for development of
comprehensive state and local emergency management systems that emphasize loss
control and prevention” (Platt 1999, 21-2). Under Director Witt, FEMA underwent
administrative and policy changes, and “redirected the direction of disaster focus toward
mitigation” (Daniels and Daniels 2000, 5).
Also in the mid-1990s, bi-partisan Congressional task forces were convened to
examine the disaster declaration process. The Senate Task Force’s recommendations
included the following:
•
•
•

Establish more explicit and/or stringent criteria for providing federal disaster
assistance
Emphasize hazard mitigation through incentives
Rely more on insurance (Platt 1999, 21)

Both the Congressional Task Force findings and the overhaul of FEMA led to increased
emphasis on preparedness and mitigation in federal disaster policy.
Disaster reform was also significantly influenced by a national assessment of
natural hazards research from 1994 to 1999, accomplished with a National Science
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Foundation grant and involving over 100 researchers and practitioners who published a
series of books on specialized topics including insurance, land use, disaster
preparedness, recovery, and response, and a national hazards risk assessment (Mileti
1999, ix). This assessment was the second national assessment of hazards research1
and was directed by Dennis S. Mileti of the Natural Hazards Research and Applications
Information Center, University of Colorado at Boulder (Tierney et al 2001, v). Mileti
addressed the issue of linking hazards and sustainability, which was determined by the
committee to be the unifying theme for the entire assessment. In the forward to his book
Mileti wrote:
The single most important contribution that this second assessment has
to offer is the recommendation for a fundamental shift in the character of
how the nation’s citizens, communities, governments, and businesses
conduct themselves in relation to the natural environments they occupy.
This book calls for and speaks to the specifics required to shift the
national culture in ways that would stop at its genesis the ever-increasing
spiral of losses from natural and technological hazards and disasters. The
task will be to create and install “sustainable hazards mitigation” in the
culture of the nation. (Mileti 1999, viii)
This passage summarizes the attitudes present in the 1990s in the reforms of federal
disaster management programs. The trend toward sustainability was also emerging in
the fields of planning and preservation during the 1990s, and therefore, indirectly,
disaster management and preservation overlapped as professionals were searching for
ways to make the built environment more sustainable for the future.
Also during this time period two large-scale disasters affected culturally-rich
places in the United States—Hurricane Hugo devastated Charleston, South Carolina in
1989, and the Loma Prieta earthquake damaged areas of northern California one month

1

The first assessment was completed in 1975. The results were published in a summary volume
by geographer Gilbert F. White and sociologist J Eugene Haas entitled Assessment of Research
on Natural Hazards (Oxford University Press, 1975).
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later. These disasters precipitated preservation conferences and publication on the topic
of disasters with respect to historic preservation, a topic that had not before been widely
studied in the United States.

Current federal disaster policy
All of this emphasis on disaster management study and reform resulted in the
current complex web of legislation and policies under which disasters are managed by
federal, state, and local governments. The Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and
Emergency Assistance Act of 1988 (PL 93-288) established cost-sharing requirements
between federal, state, and local governments in disaster response, and very importantly
provided grants for hazard mitigation efforts and planning. The Stafford Act was
amended by the Disaster Mitigation Act of 2000 (PL 106-390), with the express intention
“to establish a national disaster hazard mitigation program.” Its main goals are to
streamline procedures, reduce costs, and most importantly to give high priority to
“mitigation of hazards at the local level.” Section 101(a) of the Disaster Mitigation Act
states:
Congress finds that:
(3) expenditures for postdisaster assistance are increasing
without commensurate reductions in the likelihood of future losses
from natural disasters; …
(5) with a unified effort of economic incentives, awareness and
education, technical assistance, and demonstrated Federal
support, States and local governments (including Indian tribes) will
be able to—
(A) form effective community-based partnerships for
hazard mitigation purposes;
(B) implement effective hazard mitigation measures that
reduce the potential damage from natural disasters;
(C) ensure continued functionality of critical services;
(D) leverage additional non-Federal resources in meeting
natural disaster resistance goals; and
(E) make commitments to long-term hazard mitigation
efforts to be applied to new and existing structures.
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This increased emphasis on mitigation is also evident in the National Flood
Insurance Reform Act of 1994, the intent of which was to encourage cities and states to
implement flood-plain planning in their mitigation efforts. Flood insurance is only
available in the United States through this federally-subsidized insurance program, and it
is criticized by some as subsidizing bad development practices by enabling development
in flood-prone areas (Schwab et al. 1998, 35).
Another often-expressed criticism of federal disaster legislation is that it is difficult
for local governments, businesses, and residents to navigate the tangled web of federal
programs and bureaucracy without assistance. Mileti emphasizes this problem:
Most government efforts to cope with hazards today are fragmented
horizontally at each level of government, vertically between levels of
government, and across different types of hazards. This dispersal makes
it extremely difficult for local governments to deal with hazards in a
coherent way. (Mileti 1999, 279)
These conclusions demonstrate a recent and growing trend in disaster policy that
the role of the federal government is shifting from doling out post-disaster subsidies to
1), providing support for state and local governments to implement their own programs,
and 2), developing regional prototype models of effective and sustainable disaster
mitigation. Perhaps the next era in Platt’s continuum of federal disaster assistance will
therefore be the era of the federal government enabling state and local governments to
implement their own disaster management programs. Again, these policies do not
directly address historic preservation and planning, but overlap in indirect ways as
planners and preservationists are also concerned with sustainability in the built
environment.
It should be noted that two important events in federal disaster policy and
organization have happened in the last five years. The first change occurred in 2002 with

CHAPTER 4: PRINCIPLES OF DISASTER MANAGEMENT

46

the establishment of the Department of Homeland Security; FEMA currently operates
under the Secretary of Homeland Security rather than being the stand-alone agency it
had been since its inception in 1979. Additional changes have occurred since the 2005
hurricane season, in which the federal government and FEMA directly were criticized for
lack of adequate response. Since this time, FEMA has experienced many personnel
changes, including its director, and has been under increased public and media scrutiny.
It is expected that when analysis of the response from the hurricane season of 2005 is
complete, FEMA, and the entire federal disaster response structure will experience yet
more administrative and policy changes.

Federal historic preservation policy and disasters
Concurrent with the increasing role of the federal government in disaster policy,
the federal government has also had an increasing role in historic preservation in the
second half of the twentieth century. However, the role of historic preservation in
disaster management as established in federal policy and law is indirect rather than
being inherently stated in disaster policy. There are several ways that this indirect
relationship is established. The National Historic Preservation Act of 1966, as amended
(NHPA) is a landmark piece of preservation legislation that outlines several tools having
an effect on the way that places treat buildings after (and before) a disaster.
The most powerful tool for preservation in disaster management is Section 106 of
the NHPA. Section 106 establishes a requirement for “federal agencies to take into
account the effects of their undertakings on properties included, or eligible for inclusion,
in the National Register of Historic Places” (Preamble to Regulations Amendments, 36
CFR Part 800, Aug. 5, 2004, p. 3). This essentially means that any projects that are
undertaken by federal agencies, or funded even in part by federal money, have to
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consider the effects of the project on cultural resources. This requirement for
consideration is paralleled in the National Environmental Protection Act of 1969, as
amended (NEPA) which requires the federal government to consider its actions with
respect to the nation’s natural environment. The combination of the steadily increasing
federal assistance for disaster recovery and mitigation and the requirements of Section
106 of the NHPA as well as the requirements of the NEPA form an extremely powerful
mandate for federal agencies to consider historic preservation as they perform both
disaster mitigation and recovery. All disaster relief projects either funded by the federal
government or requiring federal licenses or permits that involve buildings or sites that
are listed on or eligible for the National Register must go through the Section 106 review
process.
The NHPA also established the National Register of Historic Places which
introduced formal criteria for evaluating buildings and created a formal list of historic
buildings, structures, landscapes, sculpture, and districts. Seen through the eyes of a
disaster manager, the National Register can be utilized during or after a disaster as a
pre-disaster assessment or prioritization of buildings. This enables quicker post-disaster
decisions about applying limited recovery resources to places that were deemed to be
culturally significant before a disaster. Many states and municipalities established their
own state or local registers for historic resources, as enabled by the NHPA, and these
state and local registers can also be useful in disaster preparedness and response
efforts.
This Section 106 review process for resources listed on or eligible for the
National Register is managed by the State Historic Preservation Offices (SHPO), which
were also established as part of the NHPA. These agencies play an extremely important
role in disaster recovery; they have the responsibility of managing the cultural resources
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that are listed on the National Register and any state register, including
recommendations for designation and Section 106 review. The SHPO and its staff are in
many cases the administrative integrity that exists for National Register sites, and are
essential members of any post-disaster assessment. Because of the enormous amount
of Section 106 reviews that are required after large-scale natural disasters, however, the
chronically under funded and overworked SHPO staff can be easily overwhelmed.
The limitation of using the National Register as a tool for evaluating cultural
significance is that sites are often designated years, or even decades, prior to the event
of a disaster, and there is no requirement in the NHPA for these sites to be re-evaluated
for significance. Several of the historic districts in New Orleans were designated in the
1960s and have not been re-evaluated since. Therefore, the resources in the districts
may very well have changed drastically in the 40 years between designation and
Hurricane Katrina; the National Register listing alone should not be used to evaluate
significance and determine priorities for resources in recovery. The same limitation
applies to buildings or sites that are individually listed on the National Register rather
than being a component of an historic district. An exception is that sites listed as
National Historic Landmarks are reviewed on a regular basis, so designation as an NHL
does indicate significance and integrity, and these cultural resources should be
prioritized during the recovery phase. Another limitation of the historic registers when
evaluating significance pre- or post-disaster is that existing registers do not necessarily
comprehensively address all historic resources in a geographic area. There may be
many other sites or districts not actually listed on any historic register, but deserving of
listing.
The NHPA also established the Advisory Council on Historic Preservation
(ACHP), with the goal of ensuring that Federal agencies act as responsible stewards of
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our Nation’s resources when their actions affect historic properties. With respect to
natural disasters, the ACHP is the federal agency that has the overall responsibility of
ensuring that historic preservation is considered during the disaster recovery and also
the disaster mitigation process. The ACHP has the final word on the treatment of
properties that are on or eligible for the National Register, and they are in some ways the
enforcement arm of the NHPA. The ACHP is one of the many federal agencies that work
together laterally following a disaster to assist in recovery and rebuilding efforts and
ensure that federal policy is maintained. The ACHP also works with state historic
preservation offices and local preservation agencies to affect preservation, which is
especially important when state and local agencies are overwhelmed.
Lastly, the NHPA delegates certain authorities to local governments. It
established the “Certified Local Government” program which allows municipalities to
receive federal grants and establish partnerships with SHPOs, which can be extremely
valuable during disaster planning and recovery. Relationships between federal, state,
and local agencies in the disaster management process are extremely important and are
discussed in the following two chapters.
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Federal agencies and disasters
Different disasters necessitate different responses from local, state, and federal
governments. Disasters can be declared at the state or federal level, and each level
authorizes response from certain agencies. In many cases, these different levels of
government must work closely together in order to affect recovery. This chapter
examines the different federal and state agencies that are involved in the disaster
management process and their relationships with each other.
The structure of federal response to disasters is delineated in the Stafford Act, as
amended by the Disaster Mitigation Act of 2000, and by a document called the National
Response Plan (NRP), which was revised under the Department of Homeland Security
in 2004. In order to initiate the federal disaster aid mandated in the Stafford Act, the
President must issue a Presidential Disaster Declaration. Once the declaration is issued,
states have access to federal assistance through FEMA. Assistance is then disbursed to
the communities through many different agencies and in many different forms; as many
as 26 other federal agencies can be involved in the implementation of the NRP (Schwab
et al. 1998, 23).
In theory, presidential disaster declarations are issued only in situations where
the disaster is of such a magnitude that the state and local governments cannot handle
the response themselves. In most disasters, the response and recovery is executed by
the states without a Stafford Act Presidential declaration; only about one percent of all
natural disasters per year result in Presidential disaster declarations (Schwab et al.
1998, 37). In cases where a Presidential disaster declaration is not issued, states can
still access federal aid through certain agencies, such as the Department of Housing and
Urban Development (HUD), that have specific assistance programs in place that are
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applied to disaster situations. One example is HUD’s Community Development Block
Grants (CDBG). Here, the overlap with historic preservation is that Section 106 review
applies when CDBGs are used to redevelop resources listed on or eligible for the
National Register. In fact, Section 106 applies to ALL federal disaster assistance
programs, not just those administered by FEMA, and which require a Presidential
declaration.
Additionally, states have access to federal disaster planning and mitigation
programs at any time, not just after a disaster occurs. Obviously, Section 106 review
applies to federal programs for pre-disaster preparedness and mitigation, as well as any
federal government assistance in support of a disaster recovery, regardless of whether a
Presidential Disaster Declaration is issued or not. Therefore FEMA works closely with
state and local governments to accomplish training.
As stated in the previous chapter, federal programs are increasingly focused on
disaster preparation and mitigation in an attempt to reduce the amount of aid required in
the responses and recovery phases of a major disaster. Therefore an increasing trend in
preservation is for Section 106 review of mitigation plans for areas containing districts
and/or sites on or eligible for the National Register.

FEMA and Disaster Management of Cultural Resources
FEMA is the most important federal agency involved with disaster preparedness
and response. The FEMA brochure entitled “This is FEMA” lists the goals of the agency
as:
•
•
•
•
•

Coordinating federal response to presidentially declared disasters
Helping residents and businesses recover
Helping emergency managers and the public prepare for disasters
Working to reduce future disaster risk
Administering the National Flood Insurance Program and reducing flood risk
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Reducing losses due to fire and related emergencies (FEMA 2003)
Analyzing these goals illustrates two points about FEMA. First, FEMA’s goals

parallel the emerging national trend to focus more and more on mitigation rather than
response; only the first two of the six goals address the response/recovery phase of
disaster management, and the other four are more directly associated with
preparedness and mitigation. And secondly, each of the six goals requires extensive
coordination among federal, state, and local governments.
These goals overlap with federal historic preservation goals in several ways. In
order to meet them, FEMA has established its “Environmental and Historic Preservation
Program, which “assist[s] FEMA staff and non-federal partners to anticipate and
accomplish environmental and historic preservation review required by federal laws and
executive orders” (FEMA Environmental and Historic Preservation Programs). FEMA’s
environmental and historic specialists execute Section 106 review for FEMA-funded
mitigation or recovery projects. These projects include working with individual
homeowners whose homes are listed or eligible for the National Register and also
working with public agencies, non-profits, or educational administers to ensure
compliance with Section 106 during the rebuilding process. FEMA’s recovery efforts are
highly focused on individual buildings and do not directly address the preservation or
rebuilding of historic districts, landscapes, or cultural landscapes. These cultural
resources are less likely to have an individual or organization responsible for
maintenance and decision-making, or administrative integrity. It is certainly a weakness
in federal policy that recovery assistance, as well as mitigation assistance is
administered primarily on a building to building level, and not at the more broad level of
districts or landscapes. The FEMA Environmental and Historic Preservation staff
members do also assist communities in mitigation design projects. They aim to retain the
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elements of the community’s physical and built environment while making it more
resistant to natural hazards. In preparedness and mitigation efforts, FEMA still focuses
primarily on individual buildings, but does address preserving character and
relationships among individual buildings and landscape elements.
Another very important role of FEMA is to provide resources for state and local
governments. As stated above, most disaster events in the United States are handled at
the state and local levels; therefore it is essential for state and local agencies to be
trained in disaster preparation/mitigation and response. While much of this support and
training is focused on social issues and emergency response, FEMA’s ten regional
offices also work closely with state and local governments to accommodate historic
preservation.
One such mitigation effort is the series of “How-to Guides,” published by FEMA in
the early 2000s. These “How-to Guides” are aimed at educating local governments and
individuals on disaster preparedness and response. A specific guide for the treatment of
historic property, called “Integrating Historic Property and Cultural Resource
Considerations Into Hazard Mitigation Planning” was published in May of 2005. This
publication is extremely detailed; it is over 200 pages, and guides local governments,
community interest groups, and/or cultural organizations of all sizes and economic
means through developing a hazard mitigation plan for their cultural resources. This
process has four phases: 1) organize resources, 2) assess risks, 3) develop a mitigation
plan, and 4) implement the plan and monitor progress (FEMA 2005, Forward).
In these four steps, local governments learn how to determine which cultural
resources are likely to be damaged in a disaster and prioritize the ones that are most
important. The guide recommends gathering inventories of cultural resources from
various sources including the National Register, planning organizations, and the public,
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then overlaying maps of these cultural resources onto maps of hazard areas. This can
be done either by simply hand-drawing or by using Geographic Information System
(GIS) software. Once historic properties are prioritized for mitigation efforts, potential
mitigation actions can be analyzed through benefit-cost analysis. Finally, a mitigation
plan can be developed.
A specific application of this process was accomplished in 2002, when FEMA
Region III1 completed a demonstration project to better integrate historic preservation
goals into the hazard mitigation process. The results were published in a report entitled
“Looking to the Future: alternatives for reducing flood-related damage in historic
communities.” This repors is illustrative of one of FEMA’s important goals of working with
state and local governments to reduce losses in areas that are prone to repetitive
disasters such as hurricanes or, in the case of this study, flooding. (United Research
Services 2002, PS-1).
The community of Milton, Pennsylvania was chosen as the demonstration
location; it is a small town in central Pennsylvania in the floodplain of the Susquehanna
River that contains an historic district. Milton has experienced repetitive flooding since it
was settled in 1792. The website for the project states the goals of the study:

This study was an important step in collaboration among FEMA Region III
staff, the Pennsylvania Emergency Management Agency, the Bureau of
Historic Preservation of the Pennsylvania Historical and Museum
Commission and the Borough of Milton to determine what mitigative
actions could be taken to allow FEMA to meet its strategic goal of
reducing the loss of lives and property while minimizing any adverse
effects to historic properties.
This study illustrates the interdisciplinary, extremely collaborative efforts required
in the mitigation of cultural resources in a community. This particular project was the

1

FEMA Region III covers Pennsylvania, West Virginia, Maryland, Delaware, and Virginia.
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result of collaboration among federal, state, and local governmental agencies, as well as
local interest groups and the public, and was accomplished by the URS Corporation, a
large, national engineering and architecture firm with offices that specialize in cultural
resource management.

Additional goals are listed in the report as:
• Provide recommendations for streamlining regulatory procedures for federal
undertakings affecting historic properties;
• Suggest options for future integration of historic preservation and hazard
mitigation land-use planning efforts; and
• Create a template for use by other historic communities in Pennsylvania
(United Research Services 2002, PS-1)
The cultural resource specialists from URS accomplished the study in six months
by moving through the phases outlined by FEMA and listed above for developing a
hazard mitigation plan. Overall, the study is thorough, and analyzes several options for
minimizing future damage from flooding such as acquisition and demolition, elevation,
relocation, wet and dry floodproofing, and structural flood diversion improvements and
stream channel modifications. It applies these options to the cultural resources in Milton
and makes recommendations on treatments for different types of cultural resources
(URS 2002, 4-1 to 4-9).
Overall, the study is a good application of the principles of hazard mitigation for
cultural resources, and accomplishes its goal of serving as a model for other
communities to follow. Unfortunately, the process of creating a mitigation plan for cultural
resources is quite time-consuming, and requires professional services that may not be
available to smaller communities or those with limited budgets. Therefore, rather than
accomplishing a dedicated preservation mitigation plan as its own goal, preservation
mitigation planning could be accomplished in a more piecemeal way by simultaneously
considering disaster mitigation when other preservation efforts are accomplished, or
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considering preservation when general disaster mitigation is accomplished. An example
is to consider disaster mitigation during preservation campaigns on buildings, and
implement techniques such as floodproofing while other repairs or maintenance are also
being done. Another example is for disaster managers who are not trained in
preservation to reference the FEMA demonstration study to assist in addressing
mitigation for cultural resources when mitigation plans are done for a community.
Both the FEMA guide and the URS study are detailed and informative resources
for mitigation of cultural resources. However they are much more focused on buildings
as cultural resources, and not as much on districts, landscapes, or cultural landscapes.
As discussed in a previous chapter, it is easier to assess the monetary value of buildings
than landscapes. Because this method of mitigation planning uses benefit-cost analysis
to prioritize assets for mitigation efforts, the monetary value of landscapes is not
evaluated, nor is the monetary value of ensembles of historic resources such as districts
as a whole. Landscapes and other cultural resources are addressed, however, by
including in the mitigation strategies such considerations as using demolition or
relocation with extreme care in historic districts (even for demolition of only select
buildings) to avoid losing character-defining features of the district such as density,
landscaping, orientation, and setback (FEMA 2005, 3-17).
Another suggestion in the FEMA guide is that when elevating buildings above
certain flood levels, the surrounding landscape should be properly graded to maintain
more of the character and scale of the property. Another landscape/cultural landscape
consideration that is discussed in the study is the relationship of the community with the
waterfront. Some mitigation actions like constructing levees or floodwalls could
drastically change this relationship. Landscape protection from natural hazards is briefly
discussed in the study by suggesting options such as sediment and erosion control,
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stream corridor restoration, watershed management, and wetland restoration and
preservation. Some landscapes could have monetary value if they are used as
recreational or tourism areas (FEMA 2005, 3-22). Certainly all of these considerations
are valid, and even though a monetary value cannot be assigned to some characterdefining features, they should most definitely be taken into account when analyzing
mitigation options.

The National Flood Insurance Program and Preservation
Another program administered by FEMA is the National Flood Insurance
Program (NFIP). The 1968 National Flood Insurance Act (NFIA) (PL 90-448, Title XIII)
provided subsidized federal flood insurance for flood-plain property owners “in the
absence of affordable flood insurance from the private insurance industry” (Platt 1999,
30). Post-disaster, in order for property owners to receive federal grants or loans for
repair, they are required to obtain federal flood insurance. Because this insurance
program is administered by the federal government, the NHPA requires that historic
preservation considerations be taken into account. The NFIA is a complicated piece of
legislation that requires property owners and municipalities to adhere to certain
standards of flood mitigation in order to receive flood insurance, and also rates
communities that exceed the NFIP minimums through the Community Rating System
(CRS). The lower the CRS rating (and therefore the better the community’s mitigation
level), the greater the reduction that property owners receive in their flood insurance
rates. The NFIP also requires that communities develop a floodplain ordinance that “sets
standards for construction and rehabilitation of structures located in flood-prone areas”
(URS 2002, 1-5).
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The very nature of flood mitigation and buildings, however, means that changes
must be made to historic buildings in order to qualify them for flood insurance. Some
changes, such as raising the buildings to the minimum elevation required by the NFIP,
drastically change the historic character of buildings. To encourage property owners of
historic structures to maintain historic character, the NFIP waives certain requirements.
Communities have the option, through their local floodplain ordinances, to use two
different options for historic structures. First, variances may be granted for the “repair or
rehabilitation of historic structures upon a determination that the proposed repair or
rehabilitation will not preclude the structure’s continued designation as a historic
structure and the variance is the minimum necessary to preserve the historic character
and design of the structure” (44 CFR 60.6 (a) (1)). Second, “alteration to an historic
structure does not constitute a substantial improvement, provided that the alteration will
not preclude the structure’s continued designation as an historic structure” (44 CFR
59.1).

FEMA and SHPOs
FEMA and the State Historic Preservation Offices have been working much more
closely in the last decade in order to incorporate preservation in the disaster
management efforts of FEMA. In the 1990s a nationwide model Programmatic
Agreement was reached between the National Conference of State Historic Preservation
Officers and FEMA. This agreement balances the streamlined FEMA post-disaster
assessment process by requiring preservation to be factored into disaster recovery
efforts (URS 2002, 1-5). These programmatic agreements delineate responsibilities of
FEMA and the SHPO in post-disaster Section 106 review. They also outline specific
short cuts with respect to Section 106 review such as excluding from SHPO and ACHP
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review routine activities such as plumbing and electrical modifications, abbreviating the
time frames for SHPO review, and providing standard treatment measures for adverse
effects (Spennemann and Look 1998, 10) These agreements facilitate FEMA’s quicker
delivery of assistance while ensuring that preservation goals are still met.
Such a programmatic agreement was reached in 1994 following the Northridge
Earthquake among FEMA, the California Office of Emergency Services, the Advisory
Council on Historic Preservation, and the SHPO. One innovation in this agreement was
the delegation of normal federal responsibilities of assessment of APEs, DOEs for listing
in the National Register, and Section 106 review to a private contracting firm, working
under the SHPO, and paid by FEMA. The contractor assumed these responsibilities, and
the agreement worked very well in streamlining the process (Spennemann and Look
1998, 14).

The Federal Historic Preservation Tax Incentive Program
Another historic preservation tool that is useful after disasters is the Federal
Historic Preservation Tax Incentive Program (TIP), which was established as a part of
the Internal Revenue Code of 1986. This program allows a 20% tax credit for the
“certified rehabilitation of certified historic structures” (National Park Service 2006). This
credit is offered for buildings listed on the National Register, or eligible for the National
Register, and the rehabilitation has to be accomplished following the Secretary of the
Interior’s Standards for the Rehabilitation of Historic Buildings. However, the credit only
applies to commercial buildings, not residences. In post-disaster rebuilding where it may
be necessary to repair substantial damage to historic resources, the TIP is a valuable
tool in preservation of historic commercial buildings that may otherwise have been
demolished post-disaster.
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Special legislation for specific disasters
In specific disaster situations, Congress may pass special legislation that
provides additional aid to disaster-stricken areas. On December 21, 2005, the President
signed the Gulf Opportunity Zone Act of 2005 (HR 4440). This act, among many other
aid programs, provided for a Federal Tax Incentive of 26% for buildings damaged by
Hurricanes Katrina, Rita, and Wilma. Even though the incentive can only be applied to
commercial buildings, the increase in the tax credit from 20% to 26% is a valuable tool in
preservation post-disaster. The GOZA also increased the Rehabilitation Tax Credit for
non-historic structures from 10% to 13% (Faussett). There was a proposal in Congress
to also extend the tax credit to residential property damaged in Hurricane Katrina, but
unfortunately this was never realized. Such a credit would be an incentive to
homeowners to restore, rather than demolish and rebuild, their historic buildings after
disasters.
Additionally for Hurricane Katrina, a Programmatic Agreement (PA) was reached
among FEMA, the Mississippi State Historic Preservation Office, and the Mississippi
Emergency Management Agency. This agreement allowed FEMA to assume many
responsibilities for Section 106 review normally done by the SHPO, then provide the
SHPO fourteen days for review. This PA closely followed the PA agreed upon by FEMA
and the National Conference of State Historic Preservation Officers, and is similar to an
agreement for the state of Louisiana post-Katrina.

National Non-governmental Organizations and disasters
It is apparent that disaster legislation is complicated and all phases of the
disaster cycle (response, recovery, preparation, and mitigation) require immense
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cooperation among federal, state, and local governments as well as advocacy groups
such as the National Trust for Historic Preservation, the Center for Preservation
Technology and Training, and the American Planning Association. A large amount of
disaster aid is also provided by these non-governmental organizations, whether it be in
the form of financial, volunteer, advocacy, or professional assistance. Following
Hurricane Katrina the American Institute of Architects collaborated with the American
Planning Association at the request of Louisiana Gov. Kathleen Blanco and the
Louisiana Recovery Authority to organize the three-day “Louisiana Recovery and
Rebuilding Conference” which was held in New Orleans from November 10-12, 2005.
The conference was co-sponsored by the National Trust for Historic Preservation and
the American Society of Civil Engineers. It brought together 650 citizens, community
leaders, architects, planners, engineers, business people, and public officials who
formed planning principles and redevelopment goals, as well as outlining six themes for
the recovery process: Unify, Cooperate, Protect (using levee protection and coastal
restoration), Preserve (historic resources), Rebuild, and Improve.
As well as organizing conferences, these different non-profit organizations
mobilized volunteers, raised funds, and used their websites and publications to create
national awareness of and dialog on the problems faced following Hurricane Katrina.
The American Planning Association sent a team of experts to New Orleans to assess
the city’s post-Katrina ability to execute planning efforts; this team published a review of
its findings in November 2005. Also in November of 2005 the Urban Land Institute
presented detailed rebuilding recommendations to Mayor Nagin’s “Bring New Orleans
Back Committee.” Specific to historic preservation, the Center for Preservation
Technology and Training established an exhaustive and comprehensive clearinghouse
of information on their website to assist property owners in cleaning and restoring
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historic buildings after flood damage. These are just a few examples of the extremely
important role of national advocacy organizations following disasters. These
organizations since the widespread devastation of Hurricane Katrina are also raising
awareness among their various professional members on the need for disaster planning
and mitigation in places all over the country, not just New Orleans.

CHAPTER 6
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There are many local public and private agencies that are involved in disaster
management and cultural resource management, and these local entities vary widely
from municipality to municipality. Some cities have large departments that handle
disaster planning and management as well as city planning and historic preservation.
Other smaller cities or towns may have neither dedicated disaster managers nor
dedicated preservation or planning specialists. This chapter discusses the structure of
the local agencies in New Orleans with respect to disaster management, planning, and
historic preservation in order to demonstrate relationships between local agencies and
state and federal agencies in disaster preparation and recovery.

New Orleans and local preservation agencies
New Orleans has numerous strengths with respect to local agencies as well as
several weaknesses. The city of New Orleans has a long and distinguished preservation
history; it had established preservation organizations and efforts much earlier in its
history compared with many other American cities. Several small preservation
organizations formed in the 1920s to restore individual buildings in the French Quarter.
The Vieux Carré Commission (VCC), the second oldest historic district in the country,
was formerly created by amendment to the Louisiana Constitution in 1936, and in 1937
the New Orleans Commission Council passed an ordinance that charged the
Commission with the “preservation and regulation of all private property with historic or
architectural value within the confines of the designated district” (Vieux Carré
Commission). The 1995 Code of the City of New Orleans defined the composition,
purpose, and area of jurisdiction of the Commission. These early preservation efforts
were instrumental in the revitalization of the badly deteriorated French Quarter, and they
led to the Quarter’s later emergence as a tourist destination.
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Another example of the strong preservation presence in New Orleans is the
successful opposition to the proposal for an interstate highway along the Mississippi
River that would have cut directly through the French Quarter in the 1960s. Because of
the efforts of local preservationists, and eventually the advice of the newly-formed
Advisory Council on Historic Preservation, the plan was abandoned and the French
Quarter saved from destruction. Many other American cities did build expressways
through their older neighborhoods during this time period, permanently removing historic
fabric and resources.
The city of New Orleans has maintained strong preservation organization in both
the city government and the private, non-profit realms both because of its early
emphasis on preservation, and also because tourism has become a major portion of the
city’s economy, which relies heavily on the history and historic fabric of New Orleans.
The city has three different historical commissions: the Vieux Carré Commission (VCC),
which has jurisdiction over the French Quarter; the New Orleans Historic District
Landmarks Commission (HDLC), with jurisdiction over the eight residential local historic
districts; and the Central Business District Historic District Landmarks Commission (CBD
HDLC), with jurisdiction over the four downtown local historic districts. These latter two
landmark commissions share the same staff, and were enabled by two similar New
Orleans Ordinances.
The HDLC was created by City of New Orleans Ordinance Number 5992 M.C.S.,
which was passed in 1976 and revised in 1980. It enables the City Council to designate
historic districts, and the HDLC to designate individual buildings or sites as “Landmarks”
or “Landmark Sites.” The enabling legislation for the CBD HDLC is Ordinance Number
6699 which was passed in 1978 and revised in 1981. It mirrors the HDLC Ordinance, but
adds criteria for “Ratings of Significance” for buildings ranging from Category A:
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Buildings of National Importance, to Category F: Unrated Buildings, or “buildings that are
generally twentieth century structures that have no real architectural value” (City of New
Orleans Ordinance Number 6699, 1981). These three commissions are empowered to
review proposals for all alterations to the exteriors of buildings or building demolition in
the local historic districts as well as serve citations for “Demolition by Neglect” for
buildings that are not maintained.
The City of New Orleans is also designated a Certified Local Government (CLG)
by the National Park Service. The 1980 amendment to the NHPA established the
“Certified Local Government” as a tool to delegate some of the responsibilities of the
SHPO to certain local governments that meet fairly rigorous standards for local
preservation administration. These include establishing a historic preservation
commission, enforcing appropriate legislation for designating and protecting historic
properties, maintaining systems for identifying historic properties and including public
participation in the local historic preservation program (National Park Service 2004, 16).
With respect to disasters, in the planning and recovery process, these Certified Local
Governments can be extremely useful in assessing damage to historic properties and
making decisions on priorities for rebuilding because they have already established the
framework for administrative integrity in historic preservation. Another strong
preservation asset in the city of New Orleans is the Preservation Resource Center
(PRC), a non-profit advocacy and education organization that was founded in 1974. The
PRC has a staff of 19 and an annual budget of $1.4 million (PRC). In New Orleans
immediately after Hurricane Katrina, the PRC served as a clearinghouse for information
on cleaning and rebuilding historic properties after flooding, providing an invaluable
service to property owners, and filling in gaps in the administrative integrity of the city’s
preservation commissions.
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Since the devastation of Hurricane Katrina, New Orleans has obviously had
many preservation challenges. One of the biggest problems after a disaster in any
locality is the problem of fractured administrative integrity. In the best cases of good
administrative integrity, municipalities have strong preservation ordinances with strong
preservation commissions; New Orleans is an example of such a place. They also have
close working relationships with the State Historic Preservation Office and ties to local
and/or national non-profits that perform advocacy functions. After a disaster, the local
and state preservation organizations are stretched to, and often pushed past, their limits.
Every disaster is different and each requires organizations to perform either different
functions, or to perform “normal” functions such as the SHPO performing Section 106
review in massive quantities and within limited time schedules.
Another problem with local organizations after a disaster is that their offices and
records may have been damaged, so personnel are required to work out of temporary
facilities without access to their normal administrative working environment. In the case
of New Orleans, this problem was extreme; the staff of local agencies fled either before
or during the flooding, and were not able to return to the city for days or even months.
The New Orleans city government was forced to lay off a large percentage of its
personnel after the storm because its tax revenue was so greatly reduced in just a
matter of days. For preservationists, this meant that the staff of the three Historic
Commissions was decimated by lay-offs and relocation, and the remaining staff was
suffering from personal trauma on top of insurmountable work loads. The administrative
integrity of preservation efforts in New Orleans was shattered after Hurricane Katrina, at
the same time that its innumerable historic resources needed the help of the Historic
Commissions and the Preservation Resource Center.
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In disasters such as this, the SHPOs can, and should, work closely with the local
organizations, whether or not this relationship was a strong one before the disaster. In
Louisiana, however, the damage from Hurricane Katrina was not limited to New Orleans,
but also severely damaged many other municipalities. In short, the SHPO was just as
overwhelmed as the local preservation organizations. These shortcomings were
recognized immediately after the disaster by preservation staff, as well as the FEMA
environmental and historic preservation staff. A Programmatic Agreement was signed
shortly after Hurricane Katrina among FEMA, the Louisiana SHPO, and the Louisiana
Emergency Management Agency in order to streamline procedures for assessment of
damaged cultural resources. Volunteers flooded in from all over the country, organized
by the National Trust for Historic Preservation, the Association for Preservation
Technology, and numerous other preservation-related organizations. Additionally, these
organizations donated money, performed fundraising, and advocated for money from the
federal government for preservation purposes. The widespread damage from Hurricane
Katrina, and the widespread media coverage, precipitated an influx of aid from all over
the world for the city of New Orleans, and shed a stark light on the vulnerability of the
procedures, policies and people on which preservation administration relies.

New Orleans and factors that affect disaster recovery
The situation in New Orleans after Hurricane Katrina can be compared to
numerous historic disasters in order to analyze its strengths and weaknesses in the
recovery process. Chapter 2 of this thesis discussed factors that affect disaster recovery,
and New Orleans can be analyzed with respect to these five factors: type of disaster and
scale of destruction, nature of place affected, leadership, planning and training predisaster, and sustainability.
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The type of disaster in New Orleans—flooding that was sustained for weeks—is
a dangerous type of disaster for vernacular historic resources. Flooding such as this
causes wood to swell, which is irreparable in many cases. It also causes mold to grow
on interior surfaces such as plaster and trim, which must then be completely removed.
Additionally, the geography of New Orleans, with much of the city built below sea level,
meant that the flooding and therefore damage was extremely widespread. Entire historic
districts were damaged, and the landscape of the whole city was permanently changed.
Leadership was also a problem after Hurricane Katrina. The municipal leadership
of New Orleans was shattered. Mayor Ray Nagin had been a relatively weak leader prior
to the disaster, and following Katrina he did not take a strong stand in making largescale decisions about the repopulation and re-planning of the city. The decisions to be
made in New Orleans post-Katrina were very difficult ones, and also would be unpopular
if they meant that only parts of the city would be rebuilt. The mayor was running for reelection in May of 2006, and he was unwilling to make decisions that would be
unpopular to some of his voting constituency following Katrina. The city had problems
not only with leadership, but also followership. Many people blamed the disaster on the
municipal officials responsible for the maintenance of the levee system, and also blamed
federal officials for the inadequate level of response in recovery efforts during and
immediately following the hurricane. Because of this, the people of New Orleans were
hesitant, if not loathe, to trust public officials and their decisions. Even if Mayor Nagin
had taken a firm position on how the city should be rebuilt, it is questionable whether the
people of the city would have followed and supported his leadership decisions.
The leadership role with respect to historic preservation post-Katrina was led by
the Preservation Resource Center, along with the National Trust for Historic
Preservation, which opened a field office at the PRC office. These two organizations
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worked closely to accomplish damage assessment of hundreds of “red-tagged”
buildings, or those deemed by the city to be beyond repair and slated for demolition. The
National Trust organized volunteers from around the country to staff assessment teams.
Preservation and architecture volunteers spent a week at a time in New Orleans visiting
red-tagged buildings and making recommendations to the city on how to treat historic
buildings. This quick action undoubtedly saved numerous buildings from demolition. The
volunteers also advised homeowners on techniques for repair of historic houses.
Additionally, the Preservation Resource Center increased its educational seminars after
Katrina, teaching residents about cleaning and mold remediation. The PRC also
provided supplies for these projects and consultants for on-site advice (PRC). The
National Trust and the PRC served as leaders in advising and assisting property owners.
While other civic leaders were grappling with difficult decisions about the best way to
rebuild the city, preservation leaders were providing valuable, non-political services to
residents who were in their own ways rebuilding their individual buildings.
Another factor in how places rebuild after disasters, planning and training prior to
the disaster, can be discussed with respect to New Orleans. Even though New Orleans
was known to be highly vulnerable to hurricane damage and prone to flooding, disaster
planning and training were minimal prior to Katrina with respect to the numerous cultural
resources in the city. Even the more important planning with respect to human
evacuation and protection was clearly inadequate, as there was no plan for evacuating
the thousands of New Orleans residents who did not own cars, or could not drive out of
the city.
The last factor, sustainability, is directly applicable to New Orleans. Many experts
argue that attempts to manage the Mississippi River by the Army Corps of Engineers are
temporary, and that in the long-term, the river cannot be managed. They therefore

CHAPTER 6: LOCAL INITIATIVES

72

conclude that New Orleans is not in a sustainable location because it will require huge
monetary and engineering efforts to protect it from future flooding (Daniels et al. 2005,
47-53). Some experts make the case that the city should be moved to a new location;
others claim that the city can remain in its current location, but that its footprint should be
altered to only allow settlement in its highest and most sustainable sections. Either of
these ideas have serious ramifications with respect to historic preservation. Moving the
entire city would erase its 300 years of built cultural resources. Repopulating only
portions of the city would abandon some sections that contain vernacular historic
resources.
Another problem with sustainability and historic resources in New Orleans is that
in order for many property owners to receive federal disaster aid, they must subscribe to
the National Flood Insurance Program, which mandates certain requirements for
buildings. One example is the mandate to elevate buildings above a certain height as
specified by FEMA’s flood maps. The tension here between sustainability and
preservation is that by elevating an historic building, the character and scale of the
building is drastically changed. The tensions between sustainability and preservation will
never be completely removed, but through research like FEMA’s publication, Integrating
Historic Property and Cultural Resource Considerations Into Hazard Mitigation and
Planning, cultural resources can be made more sustainable with respect to natural
disasters.
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There is another thesis that could be written after this one. Actually several other
theses could be written after this one. My original intent was to research specific and
varied ways that people rebuild urban places following disasters. I spent the summer of
2005 in England, and was inspired to write about cultural resources and disasters after
visiting Plymouth. Plymouth was heavily blitzed in World War II and following the
devastation of the bombing, the medieval city center was completely demolished to
create a brand new city center with new buildings, a new street grid, and an entirely
different character than the character of the pre-war Plymouth. I also read about
Warsaw, Poland, which employed much different methods of urban planning than
Plymouth did during and after the war. The people of Warsaw knew that the city would
be bombed, and they carefully surveyed historic and cultural resources such as
important buildings and monuments. When Warsaw was rebuilt, some of the completely
destroyed buildings were painstakingly reconstructed in exactly the same place and form
as they were prior to the war. Why were these two places rebuilt in such different ways
following the same war?
When I returned to the United States in August of 2005, Hurricane Katrina
devastated the Gulf Coast— my Gulf Coast where I was born while my dad was in flight
school, my Gulf Coast where twenty years later I joined the Navy and went to flight
school myself, and my Gulf Coast where I was a flight instructor for three years prior to
attending graduate school. I am personally attached to this part of the world, especially
New Orleans, which possesses a cultural character unlike any other American city. How
dare Katrina mess with my Gulf Coast? The thesis that I wanted to write was about New
Orleans. The thesis that I wanted to write was a thesis that would solve all of the
problems of the post-Katrina New Orleans and return the flooded, devastated,
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abandoned city to the vibrant and gritty city of live oaks and jazz and muffeletta and
shotgun houses that I loved. Sadly, a master’s thesis in historic preservation cannot
return New Orleans to the way it was before Katrina. Nothing can. Katrina has become a
permanent part of the place and a benchmark in its history, and was both a tragedy and
an opportunity for the city. Katrina was an event that carved its presence in memories
and the built environment alike, leaving shattered minds and buildings and landscapes in
its wake.
I wanted historic preservation to be a tool that people could use to help recover
their lives in New Orleans. I wanted to write about how preservation could be this tool.
However, in order for me to understand how historic preservation could help New
Orleans post-Katrina, I had to learn about disaster management. I had to learn how
preservation fit into disaster management. And that is where this project ends and
another begins. This thesis explored the intersections between historic preservation
policy and disaster management policy in the most general and basic way. It identified
that cultural resources are important post-disaster; they are the jazz and the shotgun
houses that I remember about New Orleans and want to experience when I return. They
are the shotgun houses that wouldn’t be the same if they had to be elevated to comply
with FEMA’s flood insurance requirements. They also wouldn’t be the same with their
damaged wooden gingerbread cornice brackets removed or damaged wooden
clapboard siding replaced with vinyl. They wouldn’t be the same removed from their
streetscape of seemingly endless rows of similar houses.
This thesis identified that these vernacular, every-day resources are highly
vulnerable to damage in a disaster due to their construction materials and quality. They
are also vulnerable to demolition after a disaster because they are not necessarily
identified on an historic register, and many are owned privately and not subject to
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historic preservation review. Also, owners of these resources may be in lower-income
brackets and not able to afford historically-sensitive repair or rebuilding methods and
materials. These types of cultural resources often have no preservation organization
responsible for evaluating them for significance, designating them on any register, or
monitoring their maintenance and condition; they have little or no administrative integrity
for historic preservation.
Administrative integrity is a theme throughout this thesis. Historic preservation
policy in the United States in many cases does not allow for a specific entity to manage
an historic site once it is designated. After a site is listed on the National Register of
Historic Places there is no requirement for maintenance, monitoring, or re-evaluation
after a certain period of time. In the case of New Orleans, many of the national historic
districts were designated in the 1960s. In the 40 years since then, these districts have
changed, but have not been re-evaluated for significance. New Orleans does, however,
have strong local preservation ordinances, designated local historic districts and
commissions, and as a Certified Local Government, has more administrative integrity
than places with only national historic districts and no local managing agency.
Administrative integrity is a problem with disaster management and historic
preservation. If there is no agency, organization, or individual responsible for managing
vernacular cultural resources, then there will be no pre-disaster planning or mitigation. It
will also be more difficult post-disaster to protect these resources from demolition and
promote sensitive restoration; whatever administrative integrity was present prior to a
disaster may be disrupted, or even completely shattered post-disaster. Federal disaster
legislation does not explicitly allow for consideration of historic preservation. This
consideration is only mandated through Section 106 of the NHPA. In the recent past (the
last decade) FEMA has been working with the Advisory Council on Historic Preservation
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(ACHP) and the National Conference of State Historic Preservation Offices (NCSHPO)
to establish Programmatic Agreements (PA) for the treatment of cultural resources postdisaster. These PAs allow for standardization following disasters and are advantageous
in disaster management as each disaster experienced adds to the collective knowledge
of how to manage a disaster better the next time. These PAs are also flexible enough to
be tailored to each specific disaster in each specific state and/or locality.
A disaster is in many ways a unique problem for local managers, as many people
may only experience one large disaster in a lifetime, or none at all. States and localities
need advice and assistance from national disaster specialists. It is important to have
federal or national agencies that focus on researching historic preservation and disaster
management issues so that they can then advocate for policy, serve as a clearinghouse
for information, and educate and train local agencies. FEMA’s Environmental and
Historic Preservation (EHP) specialists currently perform these functions, but FEMA has
experienced many organizational changes since September 11, 2001, and the
permanence and stability of the EHP program are not guaranteed for the future.
It is also important for professional organizations such as the National Trust for
Historic Preservation and the American Planning Association to maintain a base of
knowledge about disasters so that when one occurs, they can assist localities in
recovery. These national organizations should also share in responsibility with the FEMA
EHP program for advocating for disaster preparedness and mitigation, especially in
places that are at risk for repetitive disasters such as floods, hurricanes, earthquakes,
and forest fires. In New Orleans, although the federal government was criticized for its
slow response to Hurricane Katrina with respect to rescue efforts, national non-profit
organizations were relatively quick in sending assistance in the form of both money and
volunteers for specific efforts related to historic preservation. The NTHP organized
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assessment teams for damaged historic buildings, the APA sent a team of experts to
assess the city’s ability to execute planning efforts for the devastated city, and the Urban
Land Institute presented detailed rebuilding recommendations to Mayor Nagin’s “Bring
New Orleans Back Committee” in November of 2005, only three months after the
hurricane.
Another theme of this thesis is the multi-disciplinary nature of historic
preservation with respect to disaster management. In New Orleans, post-disaster
planning cannot be accomplished without addressing the preservation issues of the
richly historic built environment; planners and preservationists must work together with
city officials and the public to not only develop a rebuilding plan, but also implement the
plan once it is finished. Disaster managers such as FEMA staff must work with
professionals having experience with historic buildings in order to properly assess the
structural integrity of historic fabric post-disaster. These are only two examples, but there
are innumerable other ways that preservationists must work with other disciplines to
affect treatment of cultural resources.
Planning and mitigation pre-disaster reduce the number of resources lost after a
disaster. The FEMA demonstration study on Milton, Pennsylvania combined a cultural
resource survey for the town with a disaster mitigation plan. It provided Milton city
officials as well as individual residents and property owners with guidance on mitigation
actions for historic resources that could be performed as resources allowed. It also is a
valuable tool for disaster responders to know how to prioritize limited resources for
saving or rebuilding cultural resources after a disaster. If New Orleans had such a
comprehensive plan prior to Hurricane Katrina, cultural resources in the most vulnerable
places for flooding could have been identified and mitigation steps could have been
taken before the disaster. These mitigation actions could range from wet- or dry-

CHAPTER 7: CONCLUSIONS

79

floodproofing for specific buildings to protecting larger areas of resources with adequate
levees. Any mitigation action taken for cultural resources makes them more able to
withstand the forces of disasters such as flooding or earthquakes, and therefore makes
them more resilient and sustainable for the future.
One last conclusion concerning sustainability is that while preservation
professionals should include disaster considerations when addressing sustainability of
cultural resources, disaster managers should include cultural resources and values in
their definitions of sustainability. Sustainability to disaster managers has been measured
with respect to economic and ecological factors. In addition to these important factors,
the presence of cultural resources greatly contributes to the sustainability of a place by
enhancing quality of life, contributing to economic vitality, and as National Trust for
Historic Preservation Richard Moe stated, “Meaningful connections with our past can
help us plot a sure course for the future” (Moe 2006, 2).
In summary, there are five conclusions to this thesis, and also several possible
areas of future study with respect to disasters and historic preservation. The conclusions
are as follows:
•

Vernacular cultural resources are vulnerable in disaster situations.

•

There are specific roles that federal agencies and national non-profit
organizations should play in disaster management with respect to historic
preservation.

•

Disaster management is inherently multi-disciplinary, and many different
professionals must work together to integrate historic preservation and disaster
management.

•

Disaster planning and mitigation increase the resiliency of cultural resources in
disaster situations, and should be considered by preservationists as they engage
in preservation efforts for buildings, districts, and landscapes.
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Cultural resources are vital elements of our environment and must be included in
sustainability considerations by disaster managers.

The following are ideas that emerged as I was writing this thesis on topics for future
research:
•

The general conclusions of this thesis could be more directly applied to the
disaster response and recovery for Katrina. These lessons learned could then be
applied to draw new conclusions about improvements to federal, state, and local
disaster policy. Specifically, recommendations could be made on ways to include
historic preservation concerns in the Stafford Act and other federal disaster
legislation that currently provide no consideration for cultural resources.

•

A study similar to FEMA’s demonstration study for Milton, Pennsylvania on
mitigation for cultural resources could be completed for New Orleans, or any
other disaster-prone location.

•

The effects of a disaster on heritage tourism, and the ways that heritage tourism
could help a place recover from a disaster could be studied in New Orleans, as
much of the city’s economy was based on this type of tourism prior to Katrina.

•

The local and national historic districts in New Orleans could be re-evaluated for
integrity and significance following the devastation of Katrina.

•

Remembrance, or memorialization of Katrina will take many forms in the future,
and these different forms of remembrance in the built environment could be
studied.

•

New construction in New Orleans post-Katrina could be studied for its
relationship to the city’s rich historical architectural heritage and vocabulary and
unique character.

•

Policy changes to the requirements of Certified Local Governments could be
suggested, possibly requiring localities to perform disaster mitigation plans.

•

Cities that have strong preservation organizations and strong HABS/HAER
documentation could be compared to cities having little or no preservation efforts
and/or documentation to draw conclusions about how these efforts facilitate
recovery and preservation after disasters.
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Theories of New Urbanism are most often applied to construction of new
neighborhoods, and often disregard the history, vernacular architectural styles,
and culture already existing in the place. The New Urbanist theories of creating
pedestrian-friendly mixed-use communities should first of all, incorporate historic
preservation theories and concerns, then secondly, could be applied to areas
where devastation has not cleared a blank slate, but left many elements of the
built environment.

There are innumerable professionals and volunteers who have been working
tirelessly on preserving the character-defining features of New Orleans following the
devastation of Hurricane Katrina. There are also many people working tirelessly to
preserve the cultural landscapes of its neighborhoods. Hopefully the lessons learned in
New Orleans after Hurricane Katrina can be incorporated into our nation’s collective
knowledge of disaster management and historic preservation. Hopefully the lessons
learned will encourage communities across the country to engage in multi-disciplinary
disaster planning and mitigation in order to make our heritage of the past more
sustainable for the future.
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